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INTRODUCTION
On the reality television show "Flip This House," real estate
dealers buy properties at low cost, renovate the houses, and resell
them at a profit.' With an analogous investment strategy, private
equity funds "flip" their portfolio companies.2 Private equity funds
buy companies that they believe can increase in value, hire others to
manage and improve the companies, and then sell the companies at a
profit.' Because real estate dealers, like those starring in "Flip This
House," engage in a "trade or business" for tax purposes, their profits
from selling real estate are taxed as ordinary income.' Despite their
similarity to real estate investment companies, private equity funds
* @ 2014 Valerie M. Hughes.
1. See Flip This House Show Summary, TV.COM, http://www.tv.com/shows/flip-this-
house (last visited Apr. 12, 2014).
2. See Steven M. Rosenthal, Private Equity is a Business: Sun Capital and Beyond,
140 TAX NOTES 1459, 1467 (2013); Lee A. Sheppard, The Sun Capital Decision in
Perspective, 140 TAX NOTES 1351, 1351 (2013).
3. See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1467. Another similarity between real estate
dealers and private equity funds is that private equity funds often put their portfolio
companies into debt by acquiring them through leveraged buyouts. See Andrew W.
Needham, Private Equity Funds, 735 TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO (BNA) § II.B.2 (2d ed.
2010). The debt of a portfolio company could compare to buying real estate with a
mortgage secured by the property. For a discussion of the analogy between private equity
funds and real estate dealers, see Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1467 (citing N. Gregory
Mankiw, Capital Gains, Ordinary Income and Shades of Gray, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2012,
at BU4).
4. When a taxpayer improves real property, for example by subdividing and
developing it, and then sells the property, that taxpayer holds property for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of a real estate business. See Bynum v. Comm'r, 46 T.C.
295, 300 (1966). An asset that is "held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of his trade or business" does not qualify as a capital asset, and
therefore any gain on such property will not be taxed at the long-term capital gains rate.
See I.R.C. §§ 1221(a)(2), 1231 (2012). The line between a passive real estate investor and
real estate dealer can be hard to draw, though, and courts determine this issue based on
the facts of each case. See Bynum, 46 T.C. at 299. Many courts, including the Supreme
Court, consider the continuity, frequency, and substantiality of real estate sales when
determining whether real estate is held as in the course of a trade or business or as a
passive investment, though courts have not adopted a uniform standard for making this
determination. See 1 STEFAN F. TUCKER, SUSAN T. EDLAVITCH & BRIAN J. O'CONNOR,
TAX PLANNING FOR REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 4:5 (2013).
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historically have not classified themselves as engaged in a "trade or
business" for tax purposes.' Categorized as investors and structured
as pass-through entities,6 private equity funds pay tax on their profits
at long-term capital gains rates' instead of at higher ordinary income
rates.8
In Sun Capital Partners III v. New England Teamsters &
Trucking Industry Pension Fund,9 the First Circuit may have taken a
step toward ending this preferential tax treatment by classifying a
private equity fund as a "trade or business"10 under a section of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").u By
finding that a private equity fund engaged in a "trade or business,"
5. See Brief of the Private Equity Growth Capital Council as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Appellees' Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 6, Sun
Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129
(1st Cir. 2013) (No. 12-2312) ("For decades, investors have relied on the fact that making
and deriving income from investments ... and paying professional managers to manage
those investments, does not constitute a 'trade or business' for purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code."). Private equity funds have characterized themselves as engaged in
investment activity, and the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has not challenged that
characterization. See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1459-60; Amy S. Elliott, Audit Proof?
How Hedge Funds, PE Funds, and PTPs Escape the IRS, TAX ANALYSTS (July 23, 2012),
http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/features.nsflArticles/6BF2832AEAE95EE785257A4400
5DBB39?OpenDocument (stating that the IRS lacks the resources to audit many private
equity funds and that the 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act hinders the IRS's
efforts in auditing these firms).
6. By "pass-through entity," I mean a partnership or limited liability company that is
taxed as a partnership. Section 701 of the Tax Code provides that partners, not the
partnership itself, are subject to income tax. See I.R.C. § 701. The income of the
partnership passes through to the partners under § 702(a)(8) of the Code. See id
§ 702(a)(8); WILLIAM H. LYONS & JAMES R. REPETTI, PARTNERSHIP INCOME
TAXATION 6-7 (5th ed. 2011). Since partnership income is taxed to the individual
partners, partnerships are subject to a single tax on gains. See id. at 2. In contrast,
corporations subject to taxes under Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code ("C
corporations") are subject to double taxation. See I.R.C. §§ 301-385. "Income realized by
a C corporation is taxable to the corporation . . . as an entity separate from its
stockholders." LYONS & REPET'rl, supra, at 2. When a C corporation distributes income to
its stockholders, the stockholders also recognize taxable income. See id. at 2-3.
7. Needham, supra note 3, § IV.A; Alexander Ripps, Private Equity Funds Face Tax
Threat as Court Questions Active Management, BLOOMBERG BNA (Aug. 14, 2013),
http://news.bna.com/airn/AIRNWB/split-display.adp?fedfid=35521557&vname=airnotalli
ssues&wsn=492029500&searchid=22504690&doctypeid=1&type=date&mode=doc&split=
0&scm=AIRNWB&pg=0 ("Traditionally, carried interest earned by private equity fund
investors and managers has been taxed at capital gains rates based on the premise they are
passive investors.").
8. See I.R.C. § 1.
9. 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014).
10. Id. at 148-49.
11. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C. (2012)).
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the court determined that two private equity funds could face pension
withdrawal liability. 2 Generally, an employer incurs pension
withdrawal liability when it participates in a multiemployer pension
plan but then ceases covered operations under the plan and does not
further contribute to the plan, even though vested benefits remain
unfunded.13 A withdrawing employer is liable for its share of the
plan's remaining vested, unfunded benefits. 4 When the withdrawing
employer cannot cover its withdrawal liability, related entities of the
withdrawing employer will be subject to the liability if (1) the entity
and the employer are under common control, and (2) the entity is
engaged in a "trade or business.""
Some view Sun Capital as a purely positive outcome, providing a
victory for "widows and orphans" over highly profitable private
equity funds and their wealthy managers.16 On the other hand,
pension funds represent a large percentage of private equity
investors." Sun Capital has the potential to increase these investors'
risk of loss if funds can now be saddled with pension withdrawal
liability.'" Private equity funds and their investors also worry that
other courts may find that private equity funds engage in a "trade or
business" under the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC" or "Code"). 9
12. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 148-49.
13. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1383(a)(2) (2012). "Covered operations under the plan"
means the operations of the business that result in a requirement to make contributions
under the plan. Vipond & Vipond, Inc. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 1950 & 1974
Pension Plans, Civ. A. No. 90-05J, 1992 WL 266000, at *3 (W.D. Pa. June 1, 1992).
14. See § 1391(b).
15. See id. § 1301(b)(1).
16. See James Surowiecki, Private Inequity, NEW YORKER (Jan. 30, 2012),
http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2012/01/30/120130ta-talk-surowiecki; Victor
Fleischer, Sun Capital Court Ruling Threatens Structure of Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Aug. 1, 2013, 12:28 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/sun-
capital-court-ruling-threatens-private-equity-structure.
17. Needham, supra note 3, § II.C.3 ("Although [pension funds] invest most of their
assets in far less risky, more liquid securities, they usually allocate a very small percentage
of their portfolios to aggressive asset classes, including hedge funds and private equity
funds. In absolute dollars, however, these small percentages represent the majority of the
capital in the private equity sector.").
18. See Brief of the Private Equity Growth Capital Council as Amicus Curiae, supra
note 5, at 4; see also Steven Rosenthal, Court of Appeals Finds a Trade or Business: Could
This Mean Higher Taxes for Private Equity?, TAXVOX: THE TAX POLICY CTR. BLOG
(July 25, 2013, 4:30 PM), http://taxvox.taxpolicycenter.org/2013/07/25/court-of-appeals-
finds-a-trade-or-business-could-this-mean-higher-taxes-for-private-equity (mentioning
pension withdrawal liability as one concern for private equity after Sun Capital, but
highlighting higher taxes as the primary concern).
19. See Brief of the Private Equity Growth Capital Council as Amicus Curiae, supra
note 5, at 6.
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However, the First Circuit carefully limited its holding to ERISA.20
The court emphasized that the term "trade or business" has no set
meaning throughout ERISA or the IRC and that the definition of
"trade or business" in the IRC was not at issue in the case.21
The court avoided directly implicating tax law by refusing to
articulate a clear standard by which to evaluate whether an entity is a
"trade or business" under ERISA2 2 and encouraged the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC") to provide guidance on the
issue.23 The Sun Funds may ultimately escape pension withdrawal
liability on remand because ERISA requires common control as well
as "trade or business" status,24 and the court confined its holding on
the meaning of "trade or business" to the particular ERISA context
at issue.25 The Supreme Court denied the Sun Funds' petition for
certiorari26 and has thus declined to reevaluate the First Circuit's
decision regarding Sun Fund IV's status as a "trade or business"
under this section of ERISA. The narrowness of the court's holding
and the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari will limit Sun Capital's
practical effect on private equity.
This Recent Development argues that the First Circuit properly
held that the private equity fund Sun Fund IV was a "trade or
business" for purposes of this section of ERISA.27 The court,
however, refused to provide a clear standard for future
determinations of whether a private equity fund engaged in a "trade
or business,"" perhaps with the worthy goals in mind of preventing
other courts from applying this holding in the tax context and
prompting the PBGC to provide further regulation in the ERISA
context. 29 This approach probably reflects a desire to avoid drastically
20. See Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 144-45 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014).
21. See id. (noting that the meaning of "trade or business" is not consistent even
within the Code).
22. See id. at 141.
23. See id. at 148.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 109-11, 120-23.
25. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 144 (emphasizing that provisions of the IRC are not
"determinative of the issue of whether an entity is a 'trade or business' under
§ 1301(b)(1)").
26. Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund,
134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014).
27. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 141.
28. See id. ("We see no need to set forth general guidelines for what the 'plus' is [in
the 'investment plus' standard].").
29. See id. at 148 ("We express our dismay that the PBGC has not given more and
earlier guidance on this 'trade or business' 'investment plus' theory to the many parties
affected.").
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increasing the tax burden on existing private equity funds and their
investors without the benefits of public notice and comment.30 Rather
than legislating from the bench by creating its own regulations, the
court indicated that Congress has a duty to clarify the law in order to
protect investors." Since Congress has not clarified the meaning of
"trade or business,"3 2 the Department of Treasury should impose
clearer standards for what "trade or business" means throughout the
IRC. With this guidance, other courts would be armed with clearer
standards to apply in determining whether a pension fund is a "trade
or business" for purposes of any particular section of the IRC.
However, the Treasury is unlikely to provide this guidance because
such a drastic change in the taxation of private equity funds could
harm investment. The Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") will probably not make this change in the absence of
Congressional action.
This Recent Development proceeds in four parts. Part I
describes the facts surrounding the private equity funds at issue in
Sun Capital: Sun Fund III and Sun Fund IV (collectively "Sun Funds"
or "the Funds"). This Part also discusses ERISA and pension
withdrawal liability under the Multiemployer Pension Plan
Amendment Act of 1980 ("MPPAA").34 Part II explains the district
court's holding and the basis for the First Circuit's reversal and
remand. Part III analyzes the First Circuit's adoption of an
"investment plus" standard and shows that this standard is consistent
with existing case law defining "trade or business" in the context of
other IRC sections. This Part also discusses the First Circuit's
application of agency law to find that Sun Fund IV engaged in a
"trade or business." Part IV considers the implications of the First
Circuit's holding for future cases, particularly the issue of whether
other courts should follow this precedent when interpreting
30. The court expressed concern at changing the definition of "trade or business"
without notice and comment within the context of ERISA, let alone in the context of the
IRC. See id. ("The PBGC has not engaged in notice and comment rulemaking or even
issued guidance of any kind which was subject to prior public notice and comment.").
31. See id. In rejecting the Sun Funds' argument that Congress did not intend
ERISA's common control requirement to force owners of a business to pay the
withdrawal liability of a company they own, the court noted that Congress was not explicit.
See id. ("We recognize that Congress may wish to encourage investment in distressed
companies by curtailing the risk to investors in such employers of acquiring ERISA
withdrawal liability. If so, Congress has not been explicit ...
32. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
33. See Fleischer, supra note 16.
34. Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendment Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat.
1208 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 29 U.S.C. (2012)).
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provisions of the Code. This Part argues that the First Circuit's failure
to adopt a clear standard for determining whether a particular fund is
a "trade or business" calls for action on the part of Congress, the
Treasury, or the IRS to provide guidance. Ideally, Congress should
act; but, given its lack of direction in this arena, the Treasury would
likely be tasked with clarifying through regulations that a private
equity fund is a "trade or business." However, any action on the part
of Congress, the Treasury, or the IRS to change the taxation of
private equity is ultimately unlikely.
I. THE SUN FUNDS' PRIVATE EQUITY STRUCTURE AND POTENTIAL
ERISA PENSION WITHDRAWAL LIABILITY
In Sun Capital, two private equity funds attempted to avoid
pension withdrawal liability after a commonly owned portfolio
company went bankrupt." This Part seeks to shed light on why the
private equity firm involved in Sun Capital structured its private
equity Sun Funds and their investments as it did. The Funds'
structures allowed them to minimize tax liability, 6 and the Funds'
method of investing in the portfolio company at issue gave the Funds
legal grounds for denying that they had incurred any pension
withdrawal liability when the portfolio company went bankrupt."
Section A describes the Sun Funds' structure and shows that the
Funds were typical, indicating that the First Circuit's holding in Sun
Capital could impact other private equity funds. Section B provides
35. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 132.
36. See id. at 133-35 (describing the formation and structure of the Sun Funds).
Compensation of private equity fund managers through service-compensatory profit
interest (also known as "carried interest") represents a form of tax arbitrage, and there is a
net tax reduction for both parties inherent in this structure. See Chris William Sanchirico,
The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers with Profit Shares: What Is
It? Why Is It Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071, 1078 (2008). The tax benefits for private
equity fund managers of receiving compensation in the form of carried interest include
both conversion of ordinary income to long-term capital gains and tax deferral until the
fund's investments are sold, as opposed to paying tax on the compensation as the fund
managers earn it. See id. at 1075.
37. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 135-36 (describing the Sun Funds' acquisition of Scott
Brass, Inc. and their division of ownership at seventy percent and thirty percent). The
seventy percent/thirty percent division of ownership of the portfolio company between the
two Sun Funds allowed the Funds to avoid the common control requirement under the
MPPAA. See Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 903 F. Supp. 2d 107, 121 (D. Mass. 2012) ("[Tlhe Sun Funds do not deny that they
considered legal advice that they could minimize their chances of facing withdrawal
liability in the future if they limited their investments to less than the 80% threshold."),
affd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S.
Ct. 1492 (2014); see also infra notes 99-116 and accompanying text (explaining withdrawal
liability under the MPPAA).
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background information on ERISA and the MPPAA and explains
how these laws impose liability on employers that withdraw from
multiemployer pension funds.
A. The Sun Funds' Formation and Structure
Like most private equity funds, the Sun Funds were
"complicated, with layers and layers of entities, domestic and foreign,
without apparent purpose, apart from tax and regulatory
avoidance."" Private equity funds make money by buying companies
that they believe can increase in value with improved management
and then selling the companies at a profit.39 To be profitable for a
private equity fund, the company "must be acquired cheaply and the
borrowed money to buy it [through a leveraged buyout] must be
cheap."' The acquired company is a "portfolio company" of the
private equity fund.41 Through a complicated structure, private equity
funds hire others to manage the portfolio companies to make them
more profitable.42 Finally, the funds sell the companies at a profit.43
First, Sun Fund III and IV both had structures that allowed them
to minimize tax liability, particularly by classifying themselves as
passive investors not engaged in a "trade or business."" Generally,
private equity firms (also known as "sponsors") create private equity
funds that are structured as a limited partnership or another type of
pass-through entity for tax purposes. 45  Funds usually have a
predetermined lifespan of seven to ten years." The funds solicit
38. Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1459.
39. See id. at 1467.
40. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 1351. Sheppard describes private equity investments as
an overall "rip, strip, and flip" strategy, this cheap acquisition stage being the "rip." See id.
The "strip" involves taking management fees directly from the portfolio company to
insulate the fund managers from loss. See id.; infra text accompanying notes 71-77. The
"flip" refers to selling the portfolio company and enjoying long-term capital gains
treatment with no effectively connected income for foreign investors and no unrelated
business taxable income for tax-exempt investors. See Sheppard, supra note 2, at 1352;
infra text accompanying notes 88-94.
41. See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1467.
42. See id. at 1461, 1467.
43. See id. at 1461; Sheppard, supra note 2, at 1352.
44. See Appellees' Response Brief at 1, Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng.
Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013) (No. 12-2312)
("Under settled law, an entity is not a 'trade or business' if its only activity is making and
managing investments and it earns only investment returns. The Sun Funds are
quintessential investors.").
45. Needham, supra note 3, § II.A.2.a; supra note 6.
46. Needham, supra note 3, § II.A.2.a.
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investments,47 and the investors are the limited partners of the fund,
while an affiliate of the sponsor serves as the general partner.48 The
Sun Funds' sponsor was the private equity firm Sun Capital Advisors,
Inc. ("SCAI"),4 9 and each fund had a lifespan of ten years.so SCAI's
co-CEOs and sole shareholders were Marc Leder and Rodger
Krouse."
Fund sponsors usually create a general partner for each private
equity fund.5 2 The general partner is a pass-through entity, often
either a partnership or a limited liability company ("LLC"), that
serves as a holding company for carried interest." Carried interest is
the amount of the fund's profits that the sponsor of the fund allocates
to the general partner.54 The general partner passes on this amount to
the fund management company." Carried interest is usually twenty
percent of the fund's investment gains.56 Sun Fund III and IV each
had a general partner structured as a limited partnership: Sun Capital
Advisors III, LP and Sun Capital Advisors IV, LP, respectively."
Because the general partner is usually a pass-through entity for
tax purposes, income can pass through it to its members but retain its
character as capital gains income, which is taxed at a lower rate than
ordinary income." The members of the general partner are often
individuals who can receive the carried interest as capital gains
disguised as compensation and thereby avoid employment tax while
47. Id.
48. See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1460.
49. See Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 903 F. Supp. 2d 107, 109 (D. Mass. 2012), aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part,
724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014).
50. See id. at 120 n.5.
51. Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund,
724 F.3d 129, 133 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014).
52. See Needham, supra note 3, § II.A.2.b.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund,
724 F.3d 129, 133-34 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014).
58. Compare I.R.C. § 1(a)-(e) (2012) (ordinary income taxed at a maximum rate of
39.6%), with id. § 1(h) (long-term capital gains taxed at a maximum rate of twenty
percent). See generally Gregg D. Polsky, Private Equity Management Fee Conversions, 122
TAX NOTES 743, 746-47 (2009) (describing the tax advantages of capital gains treatment
for carried interest). If the general partner were organized as a corporation subject to
double taxation, then income would be taxed first as the money comes into the
corporation and again upon distribution of the income to shareholders. See LYONS &
REPEMT, supra note 6, at 2-3.
2014] 1329
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also enjoying preferential long-term capital gains rates. 9 In addition,
fund managers enjoy the benefit of tax deferral because they do not
pay tax on the carried interest until they realize income from those
profits upon sale of the assets, instead of paying tax as they earn the
interest.' For the Sun Funds, Leder and Krouse controlled the
general partner and the private equity firm." Like with most private
equity funds, each Sun Fund's general partner received twenty
percent of profits, and the limited partners, who were the investors in
the Sun Funds, received the other eighty percent.62 Of the Sun Funds'
general partners' twenty percent profit, Leder and Krouse together
were entitled to receive over sixty percent.63
Similar to the general partners, the management company of a
private equity fund is generally structured as a pass-through entity,
often an LLC, and manages the fund's investments in portfolio
companies.' Many of the same people involved in the general partner
are also involved in the fund management LLC.65 The management
company usually receives a fee equal to two percent of the total
capital commitments to the fund.66 Like most private equity general
partners, the Sun Funds' general partners created their respective
management companies, but the Sun Funds were unusual in that the
general partners also owned the fund management LLCs.61 The fund
manager usually receives both twenty percent of profits, constituting
carried interest, and a two percent fee." Since the Sun Funds' fund
managers were wholly owned by the general partners,' Leder and
Krouse were entitled to over sixty percent of these amounts through
their involvement in the general partner.
59. See Needham, supra note 3, § II.A.2.b.
60. See Sanchirico, supra note 36, at 1075.
61. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 134; Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1460.
62. See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1460 (illustrating the structure of the Sun Funds
and the distribution of profits).
63. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 134.
64. See Needham, supra note 3, § II.A.2.c.
65. See Sheppard, supra note 2, at 1352-53.
66. See Polsky, supra note 58, at 744.
67. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 1352-53.
68. Polsky, supra note 58, at 744.
69. See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1461.
[Vol. 921330
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Structure of the Sun Funds 0
In addition, private equity fund managers have often taken
payments directly from the portfolio companies that the fund pays
them to manage.71 To justify these fees, "[p]rivate equity managers
used to argue that portfolio companies should pay them to be
managed and monitored, otherwise they'd have to pay [the
management consulting firm] McKinsey for the same privilege."7 2
Some have criticized private equity funds for demanding these
consulting fees from their portfolio companies because the fees put
portfolio companies into greater debt, increasing the risk that the
portfolio company will be forced into bankruptcy. Critics have
expressed concern that the management fees are just a way for
70. Id. at 1460.
71. See Dan Primack, The Death of Private Equity's Fee Hogs, FORTUNE (Sept. 5,
2013), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2013/09/05/the-death-of-private-equity-fee-hogs.
72. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 1351.
73. See Surowiecki, supra note 16.
2014] 1331
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private equity firms to take money out of portfolio companies so they
can be sure to profit whether or not the portfolio company succeeds.74
The initial reason for fund managers to take consulting fees
directly from portfolio companies was that the fund managers could
take these fees in addition to the two percent fee paid by the fund.75
However, investors have become less willing to pay the full two
percent if the portfolio company pays the fund manager as well.76
Limited partners now often demand rebates, also called "offsets," for
the amounts that the portfolio companies pay the fund manager. In
Sun Capital, Sun Fund IV took offsets from its general partner7 8-a
factor the court seemed to give great weight in its decision that the
Fund was engaged in a "trade or business," rather than acting as a
passive investor, though the court denied that this factor was
determinative. It was not clear whether Sun Fund III had received
offsets, and the court remanded for the district court to make factual
findings on this issue before deciding whether Sun Fund III was also
engaged in a "trade or business."8
The classification of private equity funds as engaged in
investment activity also minimizes tax for investors, i.e., the limited
partners. Private equity funds require significant investments and
tend to attract tax-exempt investors, foreign investors, funds of funds,
74. See id. But see Amy S. Elliott, Panelists Agree on Fee Offsets, But Disagree on Sun
Capital, 141 TAx NOTES 16, 18 (2013) (quoting investment management and tax attorney
Patrick B. Fenn's comment that, viewing fee offsets within the economic unit of private
equity funds, "you can pay it out of your left pocket, you can pay it out of your right
pocket, but you're still paying the fee" and that investors do not "derive some kind of
benefit from that offset that expands the activities that the fund is undertaking").
75. See Primack, supra note 71.
76. See id.
77. See id. (reporting that sixty-three percent of 2012/2013 vintage funds rebate one
hundred percent of portfolio companies' consulting fees to the limited partners of the
fund). But see Lydia Beyoud, 'Sun Capital' Result for Private Equity Gains May Affect
Main Street, Practitioner Says, BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY TAX REPORT (Oct. 1, 2013),
http://news.bna.com/dtln/DTLNWB/split-display.adp?fedfid=36930309&vname=dtrnot&
wsn=509628000&searchid=22504735&doctypeid=1&type=date&mode=doc&split=0&scm
=DTLNWB&pg=1 ("Sun Capital departed from the traditional structure in that the
management fees paid by the limited partners in a fund could be offset by the 2 percent
annual management fee paid to the general partner.").
78. See Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 143 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014).
79. The court took into account "a number of factors, cautioning that none is
dispositive in and of itself." Id. at 141. However, the court also stated that "the Sun Funds'
active involvement in management under the agreements provided a direct economic
benefit to at least Sun Fund IV that an ordinary, passive investor would not derive: an
offset against the management fees it would otherwise have paid its general partner for
managing the investment in [its portfolio company, Scott Brass, Inc.]" Id. at 143.
80. Id. at 148-49.
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and ultra-wealthy individuals." Tax-exempt investors constitute the
largest category of investors, and within that group, pension funds
invest the most capital.' Although pension funds invest only a small
part of their total value in private equity as part of a broader
diversification strategy, pension funds are so large that these small
percentages make up a majority of the capital in private equity.83
Foreign investors, who generally do not pay U.S. federal income tax
on their investment gains, also contribute a large percentage of
private equity capital.'
Both tax-exempt and foreign investors can maximize the returns
on their investments because of the classification of private equity
funds as engaged in investment rather than "trade or business"
activity." Historically, private equity funds have successfully
characterized their activity as investment and not "trade or
business,"86 and the IRS has not challenged that categorization."
Therefore, pension funds and other tax-exempt investors can escape
unrelated business taxable income ("UBTI") they would have to pay
if they engaged in a "trade or business" directly." Congress imposed
UBTI to prevent tax-exempt entities from reinvesting profits from
business income without first paying tax, since this tax advantage
would give tax-exempt entities a competitive business advantage. 9
UBTI excludes "dividends, interest, royalties, and gains or losses
from the disposition of property," but includes "gains from the sale of
property primarily held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
a trade or business." 90 Similarly, foreign investors can escape
effectively connected income ("ECI"), on which they would have to
pay tax if they invested directly in a "trade or business." 91 Congress
imposed a tax on ECI to balance the policy goals of taxing all income
generated from U.S. business activities and encouraging foreign
81. See Needham, supra note 3, § II.C.1-4.
82. See id. § II.C.3.
83. See id.
84. See id. § II.C.4.
85. See id. § II.C.3-4.
86. See Brief of the Private Equity Growth Capital Council as Amicus Curiae, supra
note 5, at 6.
87. See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1459-60; Elliott, supra note 5 (stating that the IRS
lacks the resources to audit many private equity funds and that the 1982 Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act hinders the IRS's efforts in auditing these firms).
88. See I.R.C. § 511(a) (2012); Needham, supra note 3, § II.C.3.
89. See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1469.
90. Id. (citing § 512(b)(5)(B)).
91. See § 882(a); Needham, supra note 3, § II.C.4.
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investments.' ECI safe harbors exempt trading in stocks, securities,
or commodities through an independent agent or for the taxpayer's
own account, but no safe harbor exempts dealers in stocks or
securities." If a private equity fund constitutes a dealer rather than an
investor, then some would argue that dealing in property besides
securities is analogous and should not fall into the ECI safe harbor.94
Because the Sun Funds' structures were typical of private equity
funds, the First Circuit's holding in Sun Capital could significantly
impact how most private equity funds are structured if other courts
rule similarly in the future. Like most private equity funds, the Sun
Funds had a sponsor, general partners, limited partners, and
management companies. The complicated structure of the Sun Funds
helped them minimize their investors' tax liability while maximizing
profits. Part of their tax-minimizing strategy involved creating as
many corporate layers of separation as possible between the Funds
and their portfolio companies in order to avoid the Funds'
classification as engaged in a "trade or business." The Sun Funds
seemed to live up to the criticism of private equity that "these firms
have become increasingly adept at using financial gimmicks to line
their pockets, deriving enormous wealth not from management or
investing skills but, rather, from the way the U.S. tax system works.""
B. The Sun Funds' Acquisition of Scott Brass, Inc. and the Funds'
Attempt to Minimize Risk of Pension Withdrawal Liability
Although the structure of the Sun Funds had a substantial impact
on the outcome of Sun Capital, the ultimate issue was whether the
Sun Funds could be held liable for their portfolio company's
withdrawal from the multiemployer pension fund in which the
portfolio company was participating. The Sun Funds invested in
Scott Brass, Inc. ("SBI") as a portfolio company, but SBI went
bankrupt while the Sun Funds held it.97 SBI then withdrew from the
pension, leaving some of the pension's fully vested benefits for SBI's
92. See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1469.
93. See id. (citing § 864(b)(2)).
94. See id. at 1469-70 (arguing that the Treasury should clarify that private equity
funds do not trade stock and securities for purposes of the ECI safe harbor).
95. Surowiecki, supra note 16.
96. See Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 132 (1st Cir. 2013) ("This case presents important issues of first
impression as to withdrawal liability for the pro rata share of unfunded vested benefits to a
multiemployer pension fund of a bankrupt company.. cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492
(2014).
97. See id. at 135-36.
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employees unfunded." This Section describes how the Sun Funds
acquired SBI as a portfolio company and provides background
information regarding multiemployer pension withdrawal liability and
how the Sun Funds sought to avoid incurring this liability when
investing in SBI.
Multiemployer pension plans result from collective bargaining
agreements with trade unions and involve more than one employer,
generally in a single industry.99 Under ERISA, if a multiemployer
plan fails, the PBGC will provide financial assistance to the plan."oo
ERISA requires each employer in a multiemployer pension plan to
pay premiums to the PBGC so that, if the plan fails, the PBGC can
pay a percentage of the total vested benefits owed to each plan
beneficiary. 0 ' Before the MPPAA, the PBGC could face
overwhelming liability under this system if one employer failed to
meet its funding obligations and withdrew from a multiemployer
pension plan." In that case, the other employers in the plan were
required to cover the vested, unfunded benefits of the employer that
terminated its participation in the plan. 03 The remaining employers
often could not or would not cover the inherited liabilities of the
departing employer on top of their own liabilities and they also
withdrew from the plan.1" These withdrawals would create a domino
effect, ultimately destroying the multiemployer pension plan and
potentially leaving vested benefits unfunded.0 ' The MPPAA sought
to avoid this problem by requiring an employer that withdraws from a
multiemployer pension plan to incur withdrawal liability.106 The
amount of liability equals the employer's share of the plan's unfunded
vested benefits accrued for the withdrawing employer's covered
employees.107
98. See id. at 136.
99. See 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(3) (2012); How PBGC Operates, PENSION BENEFIT
GuAR. CORP., http://pbgc.gov/res/factsheets/page/pbgc-facts.html (last visited Apr. 7,
2014).
100. See § 1361 ("The corporation shall provide financial assistance to pay benefits
under a multiemployer plan which is insolvent...."); see also How PBGC Operates, supra
note 99 (stating that instead of paying benefits directly to employees whose multiemployer
pension plans fail, the PBGC provides financial assistance to the plans themselves).
101. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 720 (1984).
102. See id. at 721, 722 n.2.
103. See id. at 722 n.2.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See 29 U.S.C. § 1381(a) (2012); R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. at 723-25.
107. See § 1381(b)(1).
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Since a private equity fund is not an employer, it does not incur
withdrawal liability automatically under ERISA.1 s Generally, to
impose withdrawal liability on an organization that is not the
withdrawing employer, ERISA requires two elements: (1) common
control of the employer and the organization, and (2) that the
organization is a "trade or business."" ERISA provides that the
PBGC must make regulations consistent with § 414(c) of the IRC to
clarify these requirements.1 0 According to the IRC, common control
exists between two corporations where a parent corporation owns at
least eighty percent of the total stock of a subsidiary."' However,
ERISA and the MPPAA,'12 the IRC,"3 and Treasury regulations"4 all
fail to define the term "trade or business." Even though ERISA
authorizes the PBGC to promulgate regulations in this area,"' the
PBGC has also not defined "trade or business."" 6
With this background information in mind, the methods the Sun
Funds employed to acquire SBI make more sense. The Sun Funds'
overall purpose was to "flip" underperforming companies-to invest
in them with the aim of turning them around and selling them for a
profit."' Pursuant to this goal, the Sun Funds began to invest in SBI
as a portfolio company in 2006.1" SBI manufactured metal products,
employed 208 people, and had liability to a multiemployer pension
108. See id. § 1381(a) (stating that if an "employer" withdraws from a multiemployer
plan, it incurs withdrawal liability).
109. See id. § 1301(b)(1); Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking
Indus. Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 138 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting McDougall v. Pioneer
Ranch Ltd. P'ship, 494 F.3d 571, 577 (7th Cir. 2007)), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014).
110. See § 1301(b)(1).
111. See I.R.C. § 1563(a)(1) (2012).
112. See, e.g., Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 139; Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund
v. Messina Prods., LLC, 706 F.3d 874, 878 (7th Cir. 2013) ("The phrase 'trade or business'
is not defined by section 1301(b)(1)."); Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v.
Fulkerson, 238 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[The] MPPAA does not define 'trades or
businesses.' ").
113. See, e.g., Fulkerson, 238 F.3d at 895 n.2 ("[T]he phrase 'trade or business' appears
almost two hundred times in the tax code. The particular meaning given to any single
instance of the phrase may be shaped by the surrounding statutory context of the tax code
and thus involve considerations that are absent in MPPAA." (citing Cent. States Se. & Sw.
Areas Pension Fund v. Ditello, 974 F.2d 887, 889 (7th Cir. 1992))).
114. See, e.g., Connors v. Incoal, Inc., 995 F.2d 245, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
("Unfortunately, neither section 414(c), nor the regulations prescribed thereunder, define
'trade or business.'" (citing Bd. of Trs. of W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust
Fund v. Lafrenz, 837 F.2d 892, 894 n.6 (9th Cir. 1988))).
115. See 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1).
116. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 139.
117. See id. at 134.
118. Id. at 135.
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fund, the New England Teamsters and Trucking Industry Pension
Fund ("TPF").n' At least partially to evade pension withdrawal
liability, the Sun Funds divvied up the purchase price between their
respective subsidiaries so that Sun Fund III contributed thirty percent
of the purchase price and Sun Fund IV contributed the other seventy
percent. 120 With neither Fund owning over eighty percent of SBI, the
Funds assumed they would not be deemed under common control
with SBI.121 Thus, the first of the two requirements for pension
withdrawal liability would not be met.122 By consistently taking the
position that they were not engaged in a "trade or business,"123 the
Funds sought to ensure that they would also not meet the second
requirement to incur pension withdrawal liability.
After the Sun Funds' acquisition of SBI, the fund managers,
including Leder and Krouse, "exerted substantial operational and
managerial control" over SBI.124 The Funds' management companies
served as middle men between the Funds and SBI. The management
companies provided SBI with employees and consultants from
SCAI, 25 the private equity firm that created the Sun Funds.126 SBI
continued to meet its pension obligations after the Sun Funds'
acquisition in 2006 until the fall of 2008, when declining copper prices
reduced the value of SBI's inventory.127 In November 2008, an
involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed against SBI, and the Sun
Funds asserted that they lost all of their investment in SBI in the
bankruptcy. 128 As it struggled financially, SBI ceased to be able to
meet its pension obligations. 129 In order to avoid being left with
unfunded benefits, the TPF presumably sought out any entities
related to SBI that could satisfy SBI's withdrawal liability.
119. See id. at 135-36.
120. See Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 903 F. Supp. 2d 107, 120-21 (D. Mass. 2012), aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in
part, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014).
121. See id. at 121 ("[T]he Sun Funds do not deny that they considered legal advice
that they could minimize their chances of facing withdrawal liability in the future if they
limited their investments to less than the 80% threshold.").
122. See supra text accompanying notes 109, 111.
123. See Brief of the Private Equity Growth Capital Council as Amicus Curiae, supra
note 5, at 6 ("For decades, investors have relied on the fact that making and deriving
income from investments ... and paying professional managers to manage those
investments, does not constitute a 'trade or business' for purposes of the [IRC].").
124. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 136.
125. See Sun Capital, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 111.
126. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 133.
127. See id. at 136.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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Accordingly, the TPF sent a demand letter to the Sun Funds for SBI's
withdrawal liability.130 In the letter, the TPF argued that SBI was
under common control with the Sun Funds and that the Sun Funds
were therefore jointly and severally liable for SBI's pension
withdrawal,13 ' which the TPF calculated at $4,516,539132-a very large
amount relative to the Funds' investment of $7.8 million to acquire
SBI. 33
II. THE DISTRICT COURT OPINION AND THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S
REVERSAL
In response to the TPF's demand letter, the Sun Funds sued,
seeking a declaratory judgment that they were not subject to
withdrawal liability under § 1301(b)(1) because (1) the Sun Funds did
not meet the common control requirement, and (2) neither of the
Funds was a "trade or business."" The TPF counterclaimed that the
Sun Funds were liable for SBI's withdrawal and also that they had
engaged in a transaction to evade liability under § 1392(c).35 Both
parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in September
2011.136
Judge Woodlock in the District of Massachusetts held that the
Sun Funds were not engaged in a. "trade or business" and therefore
did not meet the second requirement under § 1301(b)(1).'3 7 Although
the PBGC Appeals Board released an opinion in an informal 2007
adjudication stating that a private equity fund was a "trade or
business" under ERISA, 38 the district court owed no deference to the
130. Id.
131. Id. at 136-37.
132. Id. at 137.
133. See id. at 136 (indicating that Scott Brass Holding Corporation purchased all of
SBI's stock for $3 million of cash on hand and $4.8 million in additional borrowed money);
see also infra note 202 (describing the Funds' acquisition of SBI by forming Sun Scott
Brass, LLC, which in turn formed Scott Brass Holding Corporation, which ultimately
made the acquisition).
134. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 137.
135. Id. If the principal purpose of a transaction is to evade pension withdrawal
liability, then the transaction will be ineffective to avoid liability. See 29 U.S.C. § 1392(c)
(2012).
136. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 137.
137. See Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 903 F. Supp. 2d 107, 113, 117 (D. Mass. 2012), affd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in
part, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014).
138. See PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., (LIABILITY WITHIN A GROUP OF
COMPANIES) 14 (2007), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/Documents/apbletter/Decision--
%28Liability%20within%20a%20group%20of%20companies%29%202007-09-26.pdf.
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ruling and did not find it persuasive."' Since the district court found
that the Sun Funds were not engaged in a "trade or business," the
court did not decide whether the Sun Funds and SBI were under
common control.1 40 The district court also held that the Funds'
"principal purpose" in dividing ownership of SBI was not to evade
withdrawal liability under § 1392(c), even though the Funds did
consider the potential to lessen their withdrawal liability in choosing
this division.14' Therefore, the court granted the Sun Funds' motion
for summary judgment.42
In deciding that the Sun Funds were not engaged in a "trade or
business," the district court refused to pierce the corporate veil and
instead analyzed only the actions of the Sun Funds themselves.
Because ERISA does not define "trade or business" and refers to the
IRC in § 1301(b)(1), the court applied the "trade or business" rules
from Supreme Court tax cases, 143 notably Higgins v. Commissionerl"
and Whipple v. Commissioner.145 In Higgins, the Supreme Court held
that "[n]o matter how large the estate or how continuous or extended
the work required may be," managing investments is not a "trade or
business." 146 In Whipple, the Court similarly held that "[w]hen the
only return is that of an investor, the taxpayer has not satisfied his
burden of demonstrating that he is engaged in a trade or business. "147
Therefore, according to the district court's logic, if the Sun Funds
participated only in investment activity, the Funds were not engaged
in a "trade or business" for purposes of this section of ERISA.148
The district court also relied on Commissioner v. Groetzingerl"
in determining that the Sun Funds were not engaged in a "trade or
business.""o Groetzinger dealt with a taxpayer who questioned the
Commissioner's application of a minimum tax in connection with his
139. See Sun Capital, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 115.
140. Id. at 118.
141. See id. at 121, 124.
142. Id. at 124.
143. See id. at 113-14.
144. 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
145. 373 U.S. 193 (1963).
146. Higgins, 312 U.S. at 218.
147. Whipple, 373 U.S. at 202.
148. See Sun Capital, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 114 ("It is generally accepted that Higgins and
Whipple remain good law, and their caution that investments are not trades or businesses
survives Groetzinger.").
149. 480 U.S. 23 (1987).
150. See Sun Capital, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 116-17.
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gambling losses."' The key issue was whether the taxpayer's gambling
activity constituted a "trade or business" for federal income tax
purposes.152 The Supreme Court acknowledged that no consistent
definition for "trade or business" exists within the Code or federal
regulations,5 and the determination must be fact specific in each
case.'54 The Court also stated that difficulty rested "in the absence of
an all-purpose definition by statute or regulation, and in [the Court's]
concern that an attempt judicially to formulate and impose a test for
all situations would be counterproductive, unhelpful, and even
somewhat precarious for the overall integrity of the Code."5 s In
addition, the Court observed that Congress had the ultimate
responsibility to define "trade or business."' 56 The Court also stated
that, "to be engaged in a trade or business, the taxpayer must be
involved in the activity with continuity and regularity and that the
taxpayer's primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for
income or profit."'
Despite the Court's warnings about the limitations of its holding,
the district court stated that Groetzinger had established a test and
purported to apply it.' According to the district court, "for a person
to be engaged in a trade or business, (1) the primary purpose of the
activity must be income or profit, and (2) the activity must be
performed with continuity and regularity."'59 The parties did not
dispute that the Sun Funds met the first prong of the test because the
Funds' primary purpose was clearly to make a profit." As to the
second prong, the court found that the Sun Funds were merely
passive investors, and passive investment does not meet Groetzinger's
continuity and regularity requirement for "trade or business"
activity.'
151. See Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 25. The taxpayer was subject to a particular minimum
tax because he had taken gambling deductions, which were an "item of tax preference."
See id. He could lessen his "item of tax preference" with trade or business deductions, so
he argued that he was in the "trade or business" of gambling. See id.
152. Id. at 24.
153. See id. at 27.
154. See id. at 36.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 35.
158. See Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 903 F. Supp. 2d 107, 114 (D. Mass. 2012), aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part,
724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014).
159. Id. (citing Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 35).
160. Id. at 116-17.
161. See id. at 117.
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In making this determination, the district court looked only at
the Funds' actions and did not attribute to the Funds the actions of
the management companies or SCAI.162 The court specifically stated
that the 2007 PBGC Appeals Board decision was unpersuasive in its
finding that a private equity fund was a "trade or business."163
According to the court, the Appeals Board had incorrectly used
agency law to attribute the activity of the private equity fund's
general partner to the fund.1" The court found that the Sun Funds
themselves had no employees or offices, only made a single
investment in SBI, and only earned dividends and capital gains; the
Funds were therefore engaged in investment activity.165 Even though
SCAI participated in managing SBI and put its employees on SBI's
board of directors," the Funds themselves took no action and did not
directly manage SBI.167 The court thus found it insignificant that the
same person represented both Sun Fund IV's fund manager and SBI
in the contract between the two entities." By looking at the Funds in
isolation, separate from the fund managers they hired, and by
refusing to attribute the fund managers' actions to the Funds, the
court respected the corporate form that the parties created.169
Because the Funds themselves met the definition of passive investors,
the court found that they were not engaged in a "trade or business"
and not liable for SBI's pension withdrawal under § 1301(b)(1). 70
The First Circuit, in contrast to the district court, willingly
pierced the corporate veil to find the Sun Funds liable for SBI's
pension withdrawal. In describing the MPPAA, the First Circuit
emphasized that § 1301(b)(1) pierces the corporate veil to impose
162. See id. at 117-18.
163. See id. at 115-16.
164. See id. at 116.
165. See id. at 117.
166. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment at 25, Sun Capital, 903 F. Supp. 2d 107 (No. 10-10921).
167. Sun Capital, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 117 (stating that consulting agreements required
SBI to give updates to SCAI employees but that this requirement did not involve the
Funds themselves).
168. See id. at 118; Memorandum in Support of Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment, supra note 166, at 25.
169. See Sun Capital, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 119. The TPF argued that the Funds were part
of a partnership with Sun Scott Brass, LLC, the holding company that invested in the Sun
Funds, because ERISA and the Code do not recognize the LLC as a corporate form. See
id. at 118. The court rejected this argument as ignoring "Sun Scott Brass, LLC's chosen
corporate form" and standing "in direct conflict with the plain language of the regulations
and the case law governing corporate liability." Id. at 119.
170. See id. at 118-19.
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liability on owners and related businesses.17' The First Circuit's
agency analysis differed from that of the district court, and the First
Circuit also formulated a new test to replace what the district court
had called the "Groetzinger test."172
The First Circuit first considered the PBGC Appeals Board
decision and agreed with the district court that the decision was
entitled to little deference,"' finding that the decision received
deference only to the extent that its reasoning and analysis had the
"power to persuade."1 74 However, the First Circuit did find the
Appeals Board's analysis persuasive.'" In its 2007 decision, the
Appeals Board resolved an issue similar to that of Sun Capital:
whether a private equity fund was a "trade or business" and therefore
liable for its bankrupt portfolio company's pension withdrawal."'
Like the Sun Funds, 77 the private equity fund before the PBGC
Appeals Board argued that it was an investor and therefore not
engaged in a "trade or business." 7
The private equity fund at issue in the 2007 Appeals Board
decision was a limited partnership established under Delaware law,
with a Delaware corporation as fund sponsor.'7 9 The Appeals Board
therefore applied Delaware agency law and considered the actions of
the fund's general partner in determining whether the fund was a
"trade or business."' The Appeals Board applied the test it referred
to as the Groetzinger test,18' the same test the district court applied in
Sun Capital.18 2 Under that test, the Appeals Board found that the
fund met the first requirement: that the fund's activities had a profit
motive.' As to the second requirement-that the activities be
engaged in with regularity-the Appeals Board found that the private
equity fund did conduct activities with regularity through the
171. See Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 138 (1st Cir. 2013) (citing Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund
v. Messina Prods., LLC, 706 F.3d 874, 877 (7th Cir. 2013)), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492
(2014).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 158-59.
173. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 137.
174. Id. at 141 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
175. See id. at 140-41.
176. See PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., supra note 138, at 4-5.
177. See Appellees' Response Brief, supra note 44, at 1.
178. See PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., supra note 138, at 8.
179. See id. at 2-3.
180. See id. at 9.
181. See id. at 10.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 158-59.
183. See PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., supra note 138, at 11.
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activities of its agent, the general partner, who in turn hired the
management company.'1" In acquiring the portfolio company, the
Appeals Board determined that the fund put itself in a position to
exercise control over the portfolio company's management.1s' The
Appeals Board found that the private equity fund was engaged in a
"trade or business" and was therefore liable for its portfolio
company's pension withdrawal.' 6
Even though the PBGC Appeals Board decision was not binding
authority, the First Circuit found the decision persuasive, perhaps out
of a sense that it was not the court's job to decide this issue." Section
1301(b)(1) authorizes the PBGC to promulgate clarifying
regulations,' 8 and the court asserted that the PBGC should have
defined "trade or business" in its regulations.189 The court referred to
the approach taken by the PBGC Appeals Board as an "investment
plus" standard' 90 and approved of its use in persuasive Seventh
Circuit case law.191 In adopting this new approach, the First Circuit
refused to clarify what the "plus" of "investment plus" meant.192
Instead, the court took a "very fact-specific approach," considering "a
number of factors, cautioning that none is dispositive in and of
itself."' 93
The court found that Sun Fund IV's receipt of an offset against
the management fees it would otherwise have paid the fund manager
was a benefit that "an ordinary, passive investor would not derive."194
SBI paid $186,368.44 in consulting fees to the general partner of Sun
Fund IV, and this payment reduced the two percent fee that the Fund
184. See id. at 11.
185. Id. at 13.
186. See id. at 14-15.
187. See infra notes 232-38 and accompanying text.
188. See 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1) (2012) (stating that other organizations and an
employer withdrawing from a multiemployer pension fund may be treated as a single
employer "under regulations prescribed by the [PBGC]").
189. See Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 148 (1st Cir. 2013) ("We express our dismay that the PBGC has not
given more and earlier guidance on this 'trade or business' 'investment plus' theory to the
many parties affected."), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014).
190. See id. at 140 (citing Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund v.
Palladium Equity Partners, 722 F. Supp. 2d 854, 869 (E.D. Mich. 2010)).
191. See id. at 141 (citing Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Messina Prods.,
LLC, 706 F.3d 874, 882, 885-86 (7th Cir. 2013)).
192. See id. ("We see no need to set forth ... what the 'plus' is, nor has the PBGC
provided guidance on this.").
193. Id.
194. Id. at 143.
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would otherwise pay to the general partner.1'9 Although the court
insisted that no single factor was dispositive, 96 the First Circuit
remanded to the district court to determine whether Sun Fund III had
also received a management fee offset. 97 Because the court found
that Sun Fund IV was a "trade or business" after discussing the offset
and noting no additional factors supporting this conclusion,198 this
factor seems to have been most important to the court's analysis. The
other factors the court discussed were insufficient for the court to
hold that Sun Fund III was a "trade or business" without evidence of
offsets; 99 therefore, despite the court's contrary assertion, offsets
appear to be the dispositive factor.
In addition to offsets, the court addressed the fact that the Funds
empowered their general partners to take part in managing the
Funds' portfolio companies, a level of involvement that
"encompasse[d] even small details, including signing of all checks."20
In stark contrast to the district court's analysis,20' the First Circuit
seemed to conflate the activities of the Sun Funds themselves and the
activities of their related entities.
Ultimately, the First Circuit adopted a new "investment plus"
standard to evaluate whether a private equity fund is engaged in a
"trade or business."203 The court also reversed the district court's
grant of summary judgment to Sun Fund IV and vacated and
remanded for determination of whether Sun Fund III received offsets
for management fees, which would, in the court's analysis, make Sun
195. Id.
196. Id. at 141.
197. Id. at 148-49.
198. See id.
199. See id. (remanding to the district court "to resolve whether Sun Fund III received
any benefit from an offset from fees paid by SBI").
200. See id. at 142.
201. See Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 903 F. Supp. 2d 107, 117 (D. Mass. 2012) ("Other examples offered by the Pension
Fund to demonstrate alleged control and management by the Sun Funds are unavailing.
Employees of Sun Capital Advisors, not of the Sun Funds, . . . gave advice on . . . matters
within the scope of their management and consulting agreements."), affd in part, vacated
in part, rev'd in part, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014).
202. For example, the First Circuit stated that "the Sun Funds' controlling stake in SBI
placed them and their affiliated entities in a position where they were intimately involved
in the management and operation of the company." Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 142.
However, this statement ignores the fact that "the Sun Funds formed Sun Scott Brass,
LLC ... as a vehicle to invest in SBI" and that this LLC formed a wholly owned
subsidiary, Scott Brass Holding Corporation, which actually purchased the stock of SBI.
Id. at 135-36. Although the Sun Funds provided the capital for the investment in SBI, it
does not seem that the Funds themselves held the SBI stock directly. See id. at 136.
203. See id. at 140-41.
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Fund III a "trade or business."204 Since the district court did not
decide the issue of common control,205 the First Circuit also remanded
for a determination on that issue with respect to both Funds.206 The
Sun Funds submitted a petition for rehearing, but the First Circuit
denied the petition.2  The Sun Funds also submitted a petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court in which they argued that the First
Circuit incorrectly held that the Funds engaged in "trade or business"
activity.208 The Supreme Court denied the Sun Funds' petition for
certiorari,20 leaving the First Circuit's determination on the "trade or
business" issue untouched.
The First Circuit also denied the TPF's appeal under § 1392(c). 210
Unlike the district court, the First Circuit did not address the issue of
whether the "principle purpose" of the Sun Funds' division of
ownership of SBI had been to evade withdrawal liability.21 1 Instead,
the First Circuit found that the TPF could attain no remedy under the
statute.212 The statute would allow the court to disregard a transaction
that resulted in evasion of withdrawal liability, but the statute would
not allow the court to create a transaction that never occurred in
which Sun Fund IV acquired one hundred percent of SBI.2 13
Therefore, the court affirmed summary judgment on that issue.214
III. THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S ADOPTION OF AN "INVESTMENT PLUS"
STANDARD AND APPLICATION OF AGENCY LAW
This Part argues that the First Circuit acted consistently with
legal precedent in adopting an "investment plus" standard and using
agency analysis to find that Sun Fund IV was a "trade or business."
Without a definition for "trade or business," the court chose to rely
on persuasive authority from the PBGC, decisions from other courts,
204. See id. at 148-50. Like the district court, the First Circuit also rejected the TPF's
argument that the Sun Funds could be liable for the pension withdrawal of their portfolio
company because the Sun Funds sought to evade that liability under § 1392(c). See id. at
149-50. The First Circuit used different reasoning from the district court but affirmed the
district court's ruling on this issue. See id.
205. See Sun Capital, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 118.
206. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 150.
207. See Order of Court, Sun Capital, 724 F.3d 129 (No. 12-02312), 2013 BL 197393.
208. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng.
Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Fund, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014) (No. 13-648).
209. Sun Capital, 134 S. Ct. 1492.
210. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 149.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id. 149-50.
214. See id. at 150.
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and Supreme Court decisions defining "trade or business" in other
contexts. Although the First Circuit's "investment plus" test may not
clearly flow from any of these persuasive authorities,2 15 the standard
does not conflict with any of these sources. However, the court's
failure to articulate its use of agency law in its assertion that the
Funds themselves took particular actions that met the "plus" of an
"investment plus" standard weakens the court's analysis. Therefore,
the court's application of agency law in conjunction with its
"investment plus" standard is consistent with precedent but perhaps
ultimately unpersuasive.
ERISA and the MPPAA, the IRC, and Treasury regulations all
fail to define the term "trade or business." 2 16 In interpreting the
phrase "trade or business" for purposes of § 1301(b)(1), many courts
apply what they call the Groetzinger test, asking whether the activity
is (1) engaged in for income or profit, and (2) carried on with
regularity and continuity.217 The Sun Funds argued that "cases
interpreting the phrase 'trade or business' as used anywhere in the
[IRCI are binding because Congress intended for that phrase to be a
term of art with a consistent meaning across uses. "218 However, this
argument is insupportable because the Supreme Court has
consistently held that the definition of "trade or business" depends on
context and is fact-specific. 219 Even the use of the Groetzinger test is
problematic since the Groetzinger Court carefully limited its holding
to the particular Code sections at issue. 220 The First Circuit therefore
correctly stated that interpretations of other provisions of the IRC are
not "determinative of the issue of whether an entity is a trade or
215. In Higgins, Whipple, and Groetzinger, the Supreme Court interpreted the meaning
of "trade or business" in the context of the IRC, not ERISA. See id. at 144 ("[W]e reject
the proposition that ... interpretations of other provisions of the [IRC] are determinative
of the issue of whether an entity is a 'trade or business' under § 1301(b)(1).").
216. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
217. See, e.g., Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Messina Prods., LLC, 706
F.3d 874, 878 (7th Cir. 2013) ("To apply the term ['trade or business'] under the MPPAA,
we have adopted the test adopted by the Supreme Court for other tax purposes in
[Groetzinger].").
218. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 144.
219. See Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 27 n.8 (1987); Higgins v. Comm'r, 312
U.S. 212, 217 (1941) (stating that the definition of "trade or business" for one issue did not
control in a dissimilar inquiry and that a determination of whether a taxpayer is engaged
in a trade or business "requires an examination of the facts in each case").
220. See Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 27 n.8 ("We caution that in this opinion our
interpretation of the phrase 'trade or business' is confined to the specific sections of the
Code at issue here. We do not purport to construe the phrase where it appears in other
places.").
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business under § 1301(b)(1)." 221 The First Circuit may have wanted to
move away from Groetzinger as a test in order to avoid perpetuating
this common mischaracterization of Groetzinger's holding. Because of
these problems concerning Groetzinger and the lack of guidance on
the meaning of "trade or business," the First Circuit looked to other
persuasive authorities to create a specific definition for "trade or
business" under § 1301(b)(1).
A. The PBGC Appeals Board Decision
The First Circuit relied in part on a 2007 PBGC Appeals Board
decision concluding that a private equity fund was not a passive
investor, but rather engaged in a "trade or business." 2 2 Despite the
problems with the Groetzinger test, the PBGC Appeals Board first
purported to apply it in deciding that a private equity fund was a
"trade or business." 223 However, the Appeals Board went beyond the
Groetzinger analysis to rebut the private equity fund's argument that
it was a passive investor rather than a "trade or business. "224
Significantly, the Appeals Board conflated the activities of the fund in
question with the activities of its affiliates. 225 The Appeals Board held
that "the [f]und's delegation of many of its management functions to
other entities, which in [one portfolio company's] case occurred
through its Management Agreement with [the fund's management
company] does not establish that the [f]und was merely a 'passive
investor.' "226 By holding that the general partner was an agent of the
fund, the Appeals Board held that the fund's active involvement in
managing its portfolio companies through its general partner made
the private equity fund a "trade or business. "227 Through the general
partner, the fund (1) provided management services, (2) hired a
management company to assist in identifying and buying portfolio
companies, and (3) received compensation in the form of twenty
221. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 144.
222. See PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., supra note 138, at 14.
223. See id. at 10 ("Although the term 'trade or business' is not defined in ERISA, the
IRC, or regulations issued by the Treasury Department, courts generally construe the
term in accordance with the statute's purpose and use the test articulated in
[Groetzinger].
224. See id. at 11-12.
225. See id. at 14 (stating that "the much more active involvement of the [flund
(through [its general partner]) with respect to its investments" made its activity
distinguishable from passive investment).
226. Id.
227. See id.
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percent of the fund's profits.2  These activities, the Appeals Board
determined, went beyond "passive investment." 229
The First Circuit seemed to find this part of the analysis
particularly persuasive,230 perhaps because the analysis considered the
fund's affiliates and attributed their activities to the fund itself. The
analysis also went beyond the factors expressed in Groetzinger to
evaluate whether a private equity fund was a "trade or business."
Although the PBGC Appeals Board did not use the term, the court,
after approving of the Seventh Circuit's use of this analysis, dubbed it
an "investment plus" standard.23'
In addition to a possible concern about misapplying Groetzinger,
the First Circuit also seemed persuaded by the PBGC Appeals Board
decision out of a concern that the court had to go beyond its authority
to decide whether a private equity fund was a "trade or business."
The court implied that it should not make this determination without
further statutory or regulatory guidance.232 The court expressed
disappointment that "the PBGC has not given more and earlier
guidance on this 'trade or business' 'investment plus' theory to the
many parties affected. The PBGC has not engaged in notice and
comment rulemaking or even issued guidance of any kind which was
subject to prior public notice and comment." 23 3 This statement seems
to recognize that a judicially provided definition of such an important
term lacks the benefits of public notice and comment that a legislative
or rulemaking determination would have. 234 The PBGC also has the
advantages of expertise in the area of pension withdrawal liability and
the ability to craft a specific, consistent regime on the issue, which a
single court cannot do.
228. Id. at 12.
229. Id.
230. See Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d 129,141 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014).
231. See id. (citing Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Messina Prods., LLC,
706 F.3d 874, 882, 885-86 (7th Cir. 2013)).
232. See id. at 148.
233. Id.
234. President Barack Obama and other Democrats have led an effort to subject fund
managers' carried interest to ordinary income tax rates rather than capital gains rates, but,
even after six years, their efforts have not yet succeeded in Congress. See Richard Rubin,
Carried Interest Tax Break Risks Being Undercut by Court, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 25, 2013,
12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-25/carried-interest-tax-break-risks-
being-undercut-by-court.html. If the Sun Capital holding were applied in the tax context,
this change could affect the "entire legal infrastructure" of private equity funds. Id.
Therefore, the court may have worried about the implications of changing-through the
judicial process and without notice-a rule that Congress has chosen for years not to
change.
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The court also raised the same concerns that the Supreme Court
expressed in Groetzinger, namely that a uniform test for "trade or
business" could be "precarious for the overall integrity of the
Code." 235 Courts seem legitimately concerned that a change in the
definition of such a prevalent term across the Code could have
disastrous results.236 Thus, the First Circuit emphasized that the
PBGC has the responsibility to promulgate regulations, and that if
Congress disagrees with the court's interpretation, it should clarify
the law.237 Consistent with this position, the court carefully limited its
holding to ERISA, stating, "We go no further than to say that on the
undisputed facts of this case, Sun Fund IV is a 'trade or business' for
purposes of section 1301(b) (1).1"238
B. Guidance from Other Courts
In addition to adopting the PBGC Appeals Board's analysis, the
First Circuit considered Seventh Circuit precedent regarding the
"investment plus" standard. The Seventh Circuit served as a logical
source of persuasive authority because it is home to the largest
teamsters' pension fund in the country and hears a disproportionately
large number of pension withdrawal liability cases.239 The First Circuit
relied on Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v.
Messina Products, LLC.240 According to the First Circuit, the Messina
court employed an "investment plus"-like analysis in its decision.241 In
Messina, the Seventh Circuit applied the Groetzinger test 2 42 in
affirming the district court's finding that Messina Products was a
"trade or business" that could be liable for pension withdrawal under
§ 1301(b)(1). 243 However, the court also looked at factors outside of
the particular activity that Messina Products had undertaken.2 # The
235. Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 36 (1987).
236. See id. at 33 (stating that the prevalence of the term "trade or business" across the
IRC explains legislative and administrative reluctance to define the term in any particular
setting for fear of creating confusion in the other settings in which the term appears). The
phrase "trade or business" "appears in over 50 sections and 800 subsections and in
hundreds of places in proposed and final income tax regulations." Id. at 27.
237. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 148.
238. Id. at 141.
239. See Sheppard, supra note 2, at 1354.
240. 706 F.3d 874 (7th Cir. 2013).
241. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 141.
242. See Messina, 706 F.3d at 878, 885.
243. See id. at 879.
244. See id. ("In deciding MPPAA cases involving withdrawal liability, we have
determined certain factors to be particularly relevant to this analysis, including the
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court considered Messina Products's operating agreement,24 5 for
example, and the First Circuit used a similar analysis in Sun Capital
when it considered the Sun Funds' private placement memos.246
The First Circuit also cited the decision of the Eastern District of
Michigan in Board of Trustees, Sheet Metal Workers' National
Pension Fund v. Palladium Equity Partners247 to support the
characterization of the PBGC Appeals Board's approach as "an
'investment plus' standard." 248 Similar to Sun Capital, Palladium
involved a multiemployer pension fund suing private equity funds and
a private equity firm for pension withdrawal liability after the funds'
portfolio companies went bankrupt.249 Although Palladium did deem
the PBGC Appeals Board's approach an "investment plus" standard,
similar to the PBGC, the Palladium court purported to apply the
Groetzinger test.25o Though the court found that the fund met the
second prong of the Groetzinger test,251 it also admitted that "the
opposite inference could be drawn from the facts as well," and the
court therefore denied summary judgment for both parties.252 The
Sun Capital court accurately cited the law in Palladium but also went
a step further than the Palladium court by rejecting the Groetzinger
test altogether and replacing it with an "investment plus" standard.253
The First Circuit left the contours of this standard unclear, though, by
refusing to define the "plus" in "investment plus." 254 In application,
the "investment plus" standard looks similar to the test the PBGC
Appeals Board and other courts have called the Groetzinger test.
The Private Equity Growth Capital Council ("PEGCC") claimed
in its amicus brief in support of rehearing that the First Circuit had
abandoned legal precedent "in favor of a novel ERISA-specific
definition that defines in very broad terms what constitutes an
'investment-plus situation.' "255 However, this characterization is
inaccurate-this definition of "trade or business" was not novel, and
defendant's intent in creating the enterprise, how the enterprise is treated for tax
purposes, and its legal form.").
245. See id. at 886.
246. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 142.
247. 722 F. Supp. 2d 854 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
248. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 140.
249. See Palladium, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 857-58.
250. See id. at 869-70.
251. See id. at 870.
252. Id. at 871.
253. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 141.
254. See id.
255. Brief of the Private Equity Growth Capital Council as Amicus Curiae, supra note
5, at 6.
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the "investment plus" test encompasses the factors considered in
Groeztinger.256 The First Circuit's definition expands a definition that
other courts had already developed in interpreting "trade or
business" under the MPPAA by looking beyond Groetzingerm25 and
adopting the PBGC Appeals Board approach, dubbing it an
"investment plus" standard.258 The "investment plus" standard
represents the same test that courts have been applying as the
"Groetzinger test," just under a more accurate name. Instead of
continuing to misrepresent the Supreme Court's holding in
Groetzinger, the First Circuit decided to rename the test for "trade or
business" and make it more flexible. The court's refusal to define the
"plus" in the "investment plus" standard259 is also reasonable given
the court's concern about delineating factors for a standard without
legislative guidance, thus imposing a judicial rule that lacks the
benefits of prior public notice and comment.2 60
C. Supreme Court Definitions of "Trade or Business" in Other
Contexts
The First Circuit's analysis is consistent with Seventh Circuit
precedent, and the analysis also does not conflict with Supreme Court
precedent on the meaning of "trade or business." In addition to being
consistent with Groetzinger, the First Circuit's holding is also
consistent with Higgins, in which a taxpayer sought to take
deductions for expenses he incurred in managing his personal
investments, which included hiring others to assist him and renting an
office. 261 The Court held that these expenses were not deductible
because Higgins was not engaged in a "trade or business." 262 The
Supreme Court stated that "[n]o matter how large the estate or how
continuous or extended the work required may be, such facts are not
sufficient as a matter of law" for a court to reverse a finding that the
taxpayer did not engage in a "trade or business."2 63 However, the
Court also pointed out that Higgins "did not participate directly or
256. See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1466.
257. See Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Messina Prods., LLC, 706 F.3d
874, 885 (7th Cir. 2013).
258. See Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund v. Palladium Equity
Partners, 722 F. Supp. 2d 854, 869 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
259. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 141 ("We see no need to set forth general guidelines
for what the 'plus' is, nor has the PBGC provided guidance on this.").
260. See id. at 148.
261. Higgins v. Comm'r, 312 U.S. 212, 213-14 (1941).
262. See id. at 218.
263. Id.
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indirectly in the management of the corporations in which he held
stock or bonds."2 " The First Circuit used this fact to distinguish Sun
Capital from Higgins.26 5
The Sun Funds argued that they were passive investors because,
like Higgins, they received only investment income and provided no
services to portfolio companies and thus derived no income in the
form of payment for services. 26 However, Higgins did not explicitly
hold that all taxpayers who receive only investment income are not
engaged in a "trade or business." As one commentator has said, "It is
one thing to manage one's [own] investments in businesses. It is
another to manage the businesses in which one invests." 2 67 The "trade
or business" issue in Higgins is therefore conceptually different from
the "trade or business" issue in private equity.21 In addition, Higgins
held that a determination about whether a taxpayer is engaged in a
"trade or business" is a fact-specific inquiry.269 Therefore, the First
Circuit could legitimately distinguish Higgins from the facts of Sun
Capital.
The First Circuit also distinguished Whipple, in which the
Supreme Court denied a taxpayer's deductions for business bad debt
stemming from personal loans he made to a corporation he owned.270
The taxpayer claimed he was engaged in the "trade or business" of
the corporation, but the Court countered that "[d]evoting one's time
and energies to the affairs of a corporation is not of itself, and without
more, a trade or business of the person so engaged." 27 1 The Court's
holding means that the "trade or business" of a corporation is not
imputed to a private equity fund that holds shares in the corporation;
but this rule does not necessarily mean that the private equity fund is
not engaged in a "trade or business." 272 Applying this rule to the Sun
Funds would mean that SBI's manufacturing business cannot be
imputed to the Funds; but Whipple's holding has no bearing on
whether the Funds were engaged in the "trade or business" of
flipping portfolio companies. The Whipple analysis thus does not
answer whether private equity funds engage in a "trade or business"
because private equity is a "hyperactive investor/service provider"
264. Id. at 214.
265. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 145.
266. See Appellees' Response Brief, supra note 44, at 27.
267. Sanchirico, supra note 36, at 1103.
268. See id. at 1102-03.
269. Higgins, 312 U.S. at 217.
270. Whipple v. Comm'r, 373 U.S. 193, 196-97, 203 (1963).
271. Id. at 202 (emphasis added).
272. See Sanchirico, supra note 36, at 1102 n.101.
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arrangement for which the tax law has no clear rule.273 Private equity
does not fall neatly into the category of passive investment, 274 So the
question of whether a private equity fund does more than devote its
energies to a separate corporation remains unclear.
The First Circuit rejected the Sun Funds' argument that they
were not engaged in a "trade or business" under Whipple because
they earned only investment income.275 The court distinguished
Whipple by reasoning that Sun Fund IV's receipt of management fee
offsets constituted activity that was "more" than mere investment
activity.276 In their petition for rehearing, the Sun Funds argued that
the court should have applied Whipple alone to reach its result rather
than creating a new "investment plus" standard.277 One critic has
similarly argued that the First Circuit's analysis "confused the
Whipple inquiry," and that the court should have held instead that the
activity of identifying and improving portfolio companies is itself a
"trade or business." 278 However, these arguments do not contradict
the First Circuit's contention that the "investment plus" test is
consistent with Whipple.
D. The First Circuit's Questionable Application of Agency Law
Although the "investment plus" test is consistent with legal
precedent, the First Circuit clouded its "investment plus" analysis
when it assumed that an agency relationship existed between the
Funds and their affiliates, but failed to articulate how it found this
agency relationship until later in the opinion. The Sun Funds argued
that the status of the general partners could not be attributed to the
Funds themselves.279 In their brief, the Sun Funds argued that, under
agency law, a principal does not necessarily take on the status of its
agent.280 Therefore, the Sun Funds implied, even if its general
partners were engaged in a "trade or business," that would not make
273. See Sheppard, supra note 2, at 1355.
274. See Steven M. Rosenthal, Taxing Private Equity Funds as Corporate 'Developers,'
138 TAx NOTEs 361, 363 (2013) ("[P]rivate equity funds are not easily categorized as
dealers, traders, or investors in stocks.").
275. See Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 145-46 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014).
276. See id. at 146.
277. See Appellees' Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 5, Sun
Capital, 724 F.3d 129 (No. 12-2312).
278. See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1466.
279. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 146.
280. See Appellees' Response Brief, supra note 44, at 33.
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the Sun Funds themselves engaged in a "trade or business."281 This
analysis is correct, but the court disputed a different argument-that
the activities of the Sun Funds' affiliates could not be attributed to the
Funds.282 The First Circuit rejected the argument that attributing the
activities of the general partners to the Funds was the same as
attributing their status to the Funds.3
The court looked first to Delaware agency law regarding
partnerships to determine whether the activities of the general
partners could be attributed to the Funds.28 Delaware law states that
"each partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its
business, purposes or activities" and that the act of a partner "for
apparently carrying on in the ordinary course [of] the partnership's
business, purposes or activities . . . binds the partnership." 285 Although
the statute concerns apparent agency, the court applied the statute to
hold that the limited partnership agreements made the general
partners the agents of the Sun Funds.286 Since the case presented no
issue of apparent agency, this reasoning adds confusion to the court's
analysis.
The court also found that the Sun Funds' grant of authority to
the general partners created an actual agency relationship between
them. 287 This argument is more logical and finds support in the
Restatement (Third) of Agency, which states that an actual agency
relationship forms when a principal manifests to an agent that the
principal assents to the agent taking action on the principal's behalf.288
281. Although neither the Sun Funds nor the court argued this point, some
commentators have found the Sun Funds' argument to be supported by partnership tax
law. See Sheppard, supra note 2, at 1357 ("The funds argued, correctly under tax law, that
the trade or business of a partnership cannot be attributed to the investors."). But see
Elliott, supra note 74, at 20 ("[Steven Rosenthal said:] 'The way our tax rules work with
financial intermediaries is that the activities of the agents or contractors are attributable to
the fund itself.... That's just section 702(b). That's the way our partnership tax rules
work.' "). However, this analysis should not be determinative for purposes of ERISA.
282. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 146 ("The Sun Funds make an additional argument:
that because none of the relevant activities by agents and different business entities can be
attributed to the Sun Funds themselves, withdrawal liability cannot be imposed upon
them. We reject this argument as well.").
283. See id. at 148 n.30 (quoting Rosenthal, supra note 274, at 365 n.43); see also
Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1463 (stating that the First Circuit attributed the activities of
the general partner to the Funds to determine whether the Sun Funds were engaged in a
"trade or business" and arguing that the general partner's activities also included those of
the management company that the general partner hired to manage SBI).
284. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 146-47.
285. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 15-301 (2014).
286. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 147.
287. See id.
288. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.01 (2006).
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The limited partners did give the general partners the authority to act
on behalf of the limited partnerships to effectuate their purposes,2 SO
this analysis makes sense.
The court rejected the Sun Funds' argument that no agency
relationship connected the Funds to the "trade or business" activity of
the general partner because the general partner, not the Sun Funds,
entered into the management service contract with SBI.290 The court
reasoned that the general partners acted within the scope of their
authority and worked to benefit the Sun Funds by providing
management services to SBI. 291 In support of this argument, the court
stated that the "investment strategy of the Sun Funds could only be
achieved by active management through an agent, since the Sun
Funds themselves had no employees." 2 92
The argument that the Funds must have had an agent in order to
function constitutes a practical, rather than a legal, reason for finding
an agency relationship. This analysis lends support to critics'
argument that the decision is results-oriented,293 because the court
looked beyond the law for its reasoning. However, some
commentators find this practical argument persuasive. 294 The Sun
Funds did not argue this issue in their petition for certiorari, 295 and
one commentator believes that this omission constitutes the Funds'
admission that a clear agency relationship existed between the Funds
and their general partners.296 However, it is also possible that the
289. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 147.
290. See id.
291. See id. at 147-48.
292. Id. at 148.
293. See Sheppard, supra note 2, at 1354 ("The fund in question had a controlling
interest in the portfolio company whose termination liability was at issue. One does have
to put termination liability where the money resides."); Lydia Beyoud, Analyst: 'Sun
Capital' Could Lead to Review of Policies Governing Private Equity Taxation,
BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY TAX REPORT (Sept. 30, 2013), http://news.bna.com
/dtln/DTLNWB/split display.adp?fedfid=36851649&vname=dtrnot&wsn=509826000&sea
rchid=22504919&doctypeid=1&type=date&mode=doc&split=0&scm=DTLNWB&pg=1
("The case may have been results-oriented in an attempt to hold the private equity fund
liable for the unpaid pension obligations under ERISA for one of the companies it held in
its portfolio.").
294. See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1463 ("A fund must pursue its business
through others, because a fund is merely a legal fiction (that is, a partnership), not a real
person.").
295. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 208.
296. See Amy S. Elliott, Sun Capital Petitions for Review of Trade or Business Case, 141
TAX NOTES 819, 820 (2013) ("[Steven] Rosenthal said that he found it interesting that the
Sun Capital funds dropped their agency arguments, which he said had originally been at
the heart of their case. 'Private equity funds act through their agents, and to contend
otherwise is silly,' Rosenthal said.").
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Funds did not argue this point since the "trade or business" issue has
larger tax implications than the agency argument does. The court also
contended that the benefit that Sun Fund IV received as a result of
management fee offsets supported the argument that the general
partner acted within the scope of an agency relationship. 297 The Sun
Funds correctly argued that the court pierced the corporate veil with
this analysis,298 since the Funds chose their corporate structure299
presumably with the intent to separate the investors from the "trade
or business" activity.
The court's failure to discuss this point earlier in the opinion
further weakens the court's agency analysis. The court did not discuss
agency until after it had already attributed the activities of the general
partners to the Funds. Throughout its application of the "investment
plus" standard, the court conflated the Sun Funds with their general
partners and the general partners with their subsidiary management
companies." *In addition, the court used the Sun Funds' limited
partnership agreement to argue that the Funds, rather than the
general partners, were actively involved in the management of
portfolio companies, even though the agreements give the general
partner exclusive management authority.30' The court's statement that
the Sun Funds have "undertaken activities"3" directly contradicts the
court's later argument that the Funds cannot take action except
through an agent.
The court also used the Sun Funds' private placement memos3 03
to show that the Sun Funds were involved in the management of SBI,
297. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 147-48.
298. See Appellees' Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note
277, at 7-8.
299. See Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 903 F. Supp. 2d 107, 119 (D. Mass. 2012) (rejecting the TPF's argument that,
because the holding company, Sun Scott Brass, LLC, elected to be treated as a partnership
for federal taxation purposes, it should also be treated as a partnership for other purposes
and stating that this argument ignored Sun Scott Brass, LLC's chosen corporate form
under state law), aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in part, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014).
300. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 142-43 (stating, for example, (1) "the Sun Funds have
also undertaken activities as to the SBI property," rather than stating that general partners
have undertaken this activity, and (2) "the Sun Funds' controlling stake in SBI," rather
than the Sun Scott Brass Holding Corporation's controlling stake).
301. See id. at 142 ("The Sun Funds' limited partnership agreements and private
placement memos explain that the Funds are actively involved in the management and
operation of the companies in which they invest.").
302. Id.
303. A private placement memorandum is a type of investment prospectus for
investors in a private placement, which is a private offering, as opposed to a public stock
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stating that "[t]he Principals typically work to reduce costs.""3 The
court included a footnote clarifying that the "Principals" were the
individuals who worked for the general partner.3  Thus, the court
used the private placement memos to argue that the Funds
themselves were liable without clarifying that the Funds were only
liable based on agency law through attribution of the general
partner's actions to the Funds.306 Indeed, said one critic, "[t]he court
noted that the fund management company stated reorganization of
troubled companies as a purpose. Chief Judge Sandra Lynch threw
the management company's promotional materials right back at
them" by finding that these materials showed that Sun Fund IV was
engaged in a "trade or business."3 " However, the court actually threw
the management company's promotional materials at the Sun Funds,
and the court's argument would have been stronger if it had first
clarified its reasoning for doing so.
By failing to explain its reason for conflating the Sun Funds with
the general partner and the general partner's subsidiary management
company, the court effectively ignored the reasoning that the district
court had found most persuasive. As the Sun Funds claimed in their
petition for rehearing, the court ignored the distinction between Sun
Fund IV's general partner and its subsidiary management company.308
Even if the court's subsequent agency argument proves there is an
agency relationship between the general partner and the Sun Fund,
the court should have also addressed the relationship between the
general partner and its subsidiary management company.
Despite its inelegant treatment of the agency issue, the court
correctly found an agency relationship between the Sun Funds and
their general partners based on practical, rather than strictly legal,
considerations. Partnerships, such as the Sun Funds, can only act
through their agents, so a practical application of agency law would
find that a private equity fund's general partner is an agent of the
offering. See Jean L. Batman, Raising Money Through Private Placements, A.B.A.
GPSOLO EREP., Dec. 2012, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gpsolo-ereport
/2012/december_2012.html.
304. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 142 (footnote omitted).
305. Id. at 142 n.17.
306. See id. at 142 (stating that the "purpose of the Sun Funds" was to "seek out
potential portfolio companies ... in need of extensive intervention with respect to their
management and operations, to provide such intervention, and then to sell the
companies," and supporting this statement with a discussion of the private placement
memos, to which the general partners, not the Sun Funds, were parties).
307. See Sheppard, supra note 2, at 1356 (emphasis added).
308. See Appellees' Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note
277, at 7-8.
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fund." The court also accurately assumed that an agency relationship
existed between the general partners and their subsidiary
management companies, though clarification would have
strengthened the argument. The court concluded, consistent with
precedent, that Sun Fund IV was a "trade or business" under agency
law and under the court's newly adopted "investment plus" standard.
IV. THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S HOLDING AS A CALL FOR ACTION
RATHER THAN A USEFUL PRECEDENT
The First Circuit's holding in Sun Capital has the potential to
greatly increase pension withdrawal liability under ERISA for private
equity funds if other courts follow this precedent. In addition to
withdrawal liability, the First Circuit's holding could have an immense
impact on all private equity funds' qualified ERISA plan
nondiscrimination testing and coverage testing for their portfolio
companies. 10 If courts expand the holding to the tax arena, Sun
Capital could have even greater implications, particularly for tax-
exempt and foreign investors, and could also affect the tax treatment
of carried interest. All of these changes would impact private equity
funds and their investors, making it likely that the court narrowed its
holding to the ERISA context3 1 in order to minimize the potential
negative impact on investment. By failing to define the "plus" in its
"investment plus" standard, the First Circuit also avoided making a
precedent that other courts could easily apply. The court emphasized
its use of a "fact-specific approach"3 12 to conclude that Sun Fund IV
was a "trade or business." In addition, the court urged the PBGC to
provide guidance on this issue.' Because of these limitations, it is not
clear that Sun Capital will have much impact on pension withdrawal
liability or on nondiscrimination and coverage testing. The Supreme
Court denied certiorari on the "trade or business" issue,3 14 So the
309. See Sheppard, supra note 2, at 1358 ("[Private equity firms] wear a lot of hats,
which make[s] their investors vulnerable to agency arguments.").
310. See infra notes 332-40 and accompanying text.
311. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 144-45 (stating that the term "trade or business"
under ERISA does not necessarily have the same meaning as it does under the IRC and
that the meaning of "trade or business" is not consistent even within the Code).
312. See id. at 141.
313. See id. at 148.
314. Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund,
134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014). Although the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari, some believe
that the "trade or business" issue will reemerge later and will be taken up by the Court
then, while others think that the Court did not grant certiorari because the Court agreed
that a private equity fund engages in a "trade or business." See Amy S. Elliott, Supreme
Court Won't Hear Sun Capital, 142 TAX NOTEs 1024, 1024 (2014).
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limitations the First Circuit placed on its holding stand, and Sun
Capital serves as binding precedent only within the First Circuit.
Thus, the chance that the case will ultimately change the taxation of
private equity funds is even smaller.
Section A reviews the issues on remand to the district court.
Section B examines the implications that Sun Capital may have on
ERISA issues for private equity funds. Section C explores the
possible tax implications of Sun Capital for private equity funds.
A. Remand to the District Court
The court's disinclination to create a useful precedent can be
seen in the narrowness of the court's holding even within the ERISA
context. It is likely that, on remand, the district court will find that the
Funds are not under common control. Section 1301(b)(1) does not
define "trade or business," but it does define common control by
reference to the Code's definition. 15 The Code uses a bright-line test
to define common control as possession by the parent company of
eighty percent or more of the stock of the subsidiary company."' Sun
Fund IV held only seventy percent of SBI stock, while Sun Fund III
held thirty percent." The Funds divided ownership this way, in part,
to avoid common control."'8
The TPF argues on remand that the Sun Funds' co-investment in
SBI created a de facto partnership or joint venture. 3 19 The TPF
further argues that finding that Sun Fund III and IV are a partnership
or joint venture does not require the court to pierce the corporate
veil.320 The TPF argues that Leder and Krouse pooled money
between the Funds to purchase SBI jointly and that the two Funds
thus constituted a de facto partnership or joint venture.32' The TPF's
argument rests on the fact that Leder and Krouse created both Funds,
that the Funds had identical purposes and investment strategies, and
315. See 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1) (2012).
316. I.R.C. § 1563(a)(1) (2012).
317. Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 135.
318. See Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 903 F. Supp. 2d 107, 120-21 (D. Mass. 2012), aff'd in part, vacated in part, rev'd in
part, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014); supra text
accompanying notes 120-22.
319. See Supplemental Memorandum in Support of New England Teamsters &
Trucking Industry's Motion for Summary Judgment at 13-14, Sun Capital Partners III v.
New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, No. 10-10921 (D. Mass. Dec. 13,
2013).
320. See id.
321. See id.
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that both Funds hired employees of SCAI.322 Even if the same two
people, Leder and Krouse, created and ran both Funds, they clearly
chose this particular corporate structure.3 23 A court would have to
ignore the Funds' chosen corporate form to find that they were a
partnership or joint venture.3 24 Asking the court to find the existence
of a partnership between the Funds when the Funds were created as
separate entities to avoid designation as a partnership is akin to
asking the court to create a transaction that did not happen in which
Sun Fund IV bought one hundred percent of SBI.3 25 Since the First
Circuit rejected this argument in relation to the TPF's assertion that
the Sun Funds violated § 1392(c),32 6 this argument will likely fail on
remand as well. Therefore, the Funds are likely to ultimately escape
pension withdrawal liability, despite Sun Fund IV's loss on the "trade
or business" issue.
B. Impact on Private Equity Under ERISA
Commentators speculate that the First Circuit may have found it
appealing to rule in favor of a pension fund and against a private
equity fund trying to escape liability for a bankruptcy it may have had
a hand in causing. One critic asked, "What's a judge to do when a $10
billion private equity fund walks away from a dying company like a
discarded toy, leaving the Teamsters pension plan to pick up the
mess?"327 Those who view the court's holding as results-oriented
argue that the court may not have wanted to rule against the "widows
and orphans" and allow the private equity funds to use complicated
legal structures to dump their pension liability on the PBGC.32 8
Despite this criticism, the First Circuit seems to have recognized
that it was not the court's role to define "trade or business" across the
Code or even across ERISA. The court expressed its frustration that
the PBGC had failed to promulgate regulations defining "trade or
322. Id. at 17-19.
323. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment at 12, Sun Capital, 903 F. Supp. 2d 107 (No. 10-10921).
324. See Sun Capital, 903 F. Supp. 2d at 118 ("It is a basic principle of corporate law
that officers holding dual posts can 'wear different hats' when working for each.");
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, supra
note 323, at 13.
325. See Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d' 129, 149-50 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014);
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, supra
note 323, at 11.
326. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 149-50; supra text accompanying notes 210-14.
327. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 1352.
328. See Fleischer, supra note 16.
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business" for purposes of § 1301(b)(1). 329 However, the Treasury and
the IRS have also been reluctant to promulgate regulations on the
meaning of "trade or business" out of concern for making blanket
statements on an inquiry that is ultimately fact-specific. 330 Therefore,
the courts will likely continue to await guidance on this issue, and the
Treasury and the IRS will probably continue to avoid taking action
unless Congress acts first.
Even if "trade or business" remains undefined generally, the
First Circuit's holding could have a substantial impact on private
equity funds in the ERISA context. The PEGCC argued in its amicus
brief that "[w]ithdrawal liability is huge: 'U.S. multiemployer pension
plans are [underfunded by an estimated] $369 billion.' "331 However,
the effect that this holding has on ERISA may depend on how the
district court rules on remand. If the district court finds that the Sun
Funds are not under common control, and therefore not liable for
SBI's pension withdrawal, then other private equity funds could likely
also escape pension withdrawal liability fairly easily.
However, Sun Capital could impact ERISA nondiscrimination
testing for private equity funds' portfolio companies' single employer
plans, in addition to withdrawal liability in multiemployer plans. In
order to receive ERISA's tax advantages, a plan must be qualified.332
For a plan to be qualified, it must "not discriminate in favor of highly
compensated employees."3 Partnerships that are "trades or
businesses" and under common control are considered a single
employer for purposes of testing for compliance with the IRC's
nondiscrimination requirements.334 A portfolio company would be
under common control with a private equity fund if the fund owns
more than eighty percent of the stock of the portfolio company.335
329. See Sun Capital, 724 F.3d at 148.
330. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 1356 (citing Rev. Rul. 2008-39, 2008-2 C.B. 252).
331. Brief of the Private Equity Growth Capital Council as Amicus Curiae, supra note
5, at 3 (footnote omitted). Despite this argument, the PEGCC seems somewhat conflicted
on this issue. Steve Judge, representing the PEGCC, "told Tax Analysts that although
[Sun Capital] could have important effects for the private equity industry in the ERISA
context in the First Circuit, it should not be read as significant beyond that." Amy S.
Elliott, Sun Capital Petitions First Circuit for Rehearing of Trade or Business Decision,
TAX NOTES TODAY (Aug. 9, 2013) (available by subscription at
http://www.taxanalysts.com).
332. See generally I.R.C. § 401 (2012) (listing the requirements for tax qualification of
an ERISA plan); 1 RONALD J. COOKE, ERISA PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 1:3 (2013)
(discussing the concept of the ERISA-qualified plan).
333. I.R.C. § 401(a)(4).
334. See id. § 414(c).
335. See id. § 1563(a).
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Thus, if a private equity fund is a "trade or business," it could be
under common control with all of its portfolio companies."' In that
case, a private equity fund would have to conduct nondiscrimination
testing by counting all employees of the portfolio companies in its
testing.3 This aggregation could mean that the existence of different
plans at different portfolio companies could constitute a violation of
ERISA's nondiscrimination rules.338 The IRC also requires that
qualified plans meet coverage requirements for employee
participation.3 The same issues of aggregation of portfolio
companies would apply to coverage testing if a private equity fund
were deemed a "trade or business" under IRC § 410.340
C. Impact on Taxation of Private Equity Funds
Even though the court carefully limited its holding to ERISA,
the tax implications of Sun Capital could be greater than its ERISA
implications. Some believe that Sun Capital may have a significant
impact on the tax characterization of private equity fund profits.34 1 In
its analysis of Supreme Court precedent in connection with its
"investment plus" standard, the First Circuit quoted an article, which
advocated for taxing private equity profits at ordinary income rates
rather than at capital gains rates, as stating that private equity funds
336. See Appellee's Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note
277, at 13 & n.9 (citing Private Investment Funds May be Liable for Portfolio Company's
Underfunded Pension Liabilities under First Circuit Ruling, PROSKAUER ROSE LLP (July
31, 2013), http://www.proskauer.com/news/detail.aspx?news=10205).
337. See The Risks for Private Equity in Companies with Underfunded Benefit Plans,
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Nov. 2013, at 5, available at
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2013/November/05.pdf (quoting employee benefits
and executive compensation attorney Kenneth A. Raskin as saying that "[i]f in fact a fund
is part of a controlled group of portfolio companies, fund managers may have to test all
the different tax-qualified plans of all the companies in the control group to see if in fact
they pass the nondiscrimination test").
338. See Private Equity Funds May Be Exposed to ERISA Pension Liabilities and Tax
Risks: Preliminary Reflections on the M&A and Private Equity Consequences of the Sun
Capital Decision, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.sidley.com/tax-update-
09-11-2013.
339. See § 410(b).
340. See Christopher Lockman, The Sun Capital Case Could Have Broader
Implications for Employee Benefit Plans, VERRILL DANA, LLP BENEFITS LAW UPDATE
BLOG (Aug. 23, 2013, 4:40 PM), http://www.employeebenefitsupdate.com/benefits-law-
update/2013/8/23/the-sun-capital-case-could-have-broader-implications-for-emp.html
(noting that, after Sun Capital, retirement plans could be subject to coverage and
nondiscrimination requirements contained in § 410).
341. See Elliott, supra note 74, at 20 (quoting Stephen E. Shay, Harvard Law School
tax professor, as suggesting that Sun Capital "is affecting the debate on capital gains just
because of the intersection with the industry that is the highest profile industry as a
beneficiary of the capital gains differential rate").
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"are active enough to be in a trade or business."342 However, two
major questions arise if courts expand Sun Capital's holding to find
that private equity funds also engage in "trade or business" activity
for tax purposes.
1. Should Private Equity Fund Profits Constitute Ordinary Income?
Defining private equity funds as engaged in "trade or business"
activity could have a drastically detrimental impact on private equity
investment, such as by subjecting tax-exempt investors to UBTI.343 If
private equity investment income constituted UBTI, pension funds,
for example, would pay tax on private equity gains that have
traditionally been tax free.3" Since pension funds represent a large
percentage of private equity investment,3 45 reducing pension fund
investment in private equity would have a significant negative impact
on the private equity sector. Characterizing private equity funds as
engaged in "trade or business" activity could also deter foreign
investors, who currently pay no tax on their private equity gains and
would be subject to ECI.346 If private equity constitutes investment
activity, then foreign investors are not subject to ECI because they do
not invest directly in a "trade or business."34 7 Investing in private
equity also does not currently qualify as dealing in securities, meaning
that no ECI safe harbor would apply if private equity investment
gains qualified as ECI.348 Since foreign investments represent a large
percentage of private equity investment," holding that a private
equity fund engages in the "trade or business" of "developing and
342. See Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 146 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Rosenthal, supra note 274, at 365), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014).
343. See Beyoud, supra note 77; supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text
344. See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1469; Fleischer, supra note 16.
345. Needham, supra note 3, § II.C.3 ("Although [pension funds] invest most of their
assets in far less risky, more liquid securities, they usually allocate a very small percentage
of their portfolios to aggressive asset classes, including hedge funds and private equity
funds. In absolute dollars, however, these small percentages represent the majority of the
capital in the private equity sector.").
346. See id. § II.C.4; Tax Analysts Hosts Conference on Private Equity as a Trade or
Business: The Sun Capital Decision, TAX ANALYSTS (Oct. 2, 2013),
http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/pressrel.nsflReleases/181E67751AA4A9AD85257BF800
5A893D?OpenDocument (quoting Professor Shay as saying that "[i]f the Sun Capital
analysis is pushed and it were concluded in the income tax context that a private equity
fund management fee offset should be treated as income from service, then that's going to
affect the foreign investors"); supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
347. See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1469-70.
348. See id.
349. Needham, supra note 3, § II.C.4.
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selling businesses" to customers350 would also have a significant
impact on the private equity sector.351 In addition, if a private equity
fund itself engages in a "trade or business," then the fund's gains
would be taxed at ordinary income rates rather than at capital gains
rates.352 This higher tax rate353 would pass through to the partners.354
Some have argued that characterizing private equity funds as
engaged in "trade or business" activity could hurt private equity
investment by subjecting fund managers to a higher tax rate and
cutting into returns for private equity investors, thus negatively
affecting the broader economy."' Others have argued that classifying
private equity funds as engaged in a "trade or business" would
actually help private equity by allowing funds to deduct the costs of
management fees as business expenses.3 56 These deductions could be
taken above the line and offset ordinary income, instead of being
below-the-line deductions subject to the § 67 limits on deductions for
investment activity. However, many private equity investors are
tax-exempt entities that would have no use for a larger deduction for
management fees, so this change would have no impact on many
investors.358 Even though taxing income to the general partner at
ordinary income rates could increase tax revenue by taxing private
equity gains at higher rates and providing no offsetting deductions,
350. See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1469.
351. But see Fleischer, supra note 16 ("There are some other code sections, like the
'stock or securities' exception in section 864 [(the ECI safe harbor)], that may further
protect foreign investors from being treated as effectively connected with a United States
trade or business.").
352. See I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1) (2012) (excepting "property held by the taxpayer primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business" from the definition of
capital asset); see also Fleischer, supra note 16 (describing the increased tax liability fund
managers may face after Sun Capital).
353. See § 1.
354. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text (discussing the tax benefits of pass-
through entities).
355. See Beyoud, supra note 77. Foreign and tax-exempt investors could have less
incentive to invest in private equity if private equity funds were "trades or businesses" for
tax purposes. See id.; Tax Analysts Hosts Conference on Private Equity as a Trade or
Business: The Sun Capital Decision, supra note 346 (quoting Professor Shay as contending
that "[t]here's a different risk profile now than there was before [Sun Capital] was
decided, and to say otherwise is not being objective about it").
356. See Tax Analysts Hosts Conference on Private Equity as a Trade or Business: The
Sun Capital Decision, supra note 346 (quoting Patrick B. Fenn as insisting that if funds
were trades or businesses, "the government might be a loser in that result more than a
winner" because domestic taxpayer investors could deduct their outlays for management
fees).
357. See §§ 62(a)(1), 162(a), 1211.
358. See William H. Weigel, What Warren Buffet Didn't Tell You About Carried
Interest, 141 TAX NOTES 503, 509 (2013).
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private equity sponsors may use other strategies to mitigate the
negative tax effects on both themselves and investors.359 These
strategies could possibly prevent any economic harm to private equity
investment, but would also eliminate any net increase in tax
revenue.360
A separate issue involves whether the fund manager's carried
interest should be taxed at capital gains rates. Sun Capital has sparked
debate on this related issue as well.3 61 Some have argued that taxing
carried interest at ordinary income rates could harm private equity
investment because investors would be able to retain a smaller
percentage of return if their investments were taxed at higher rates.362
Most analysts agree, however, that reform of carried interest taxation
is needed to increase equity in the application of the Code.363
Regardless of its effect on private equity investments, there are
persuasive legal arguments that income from private equity funds
should be taxed at ordinary rates.36 The similarity between private
359. See id. at 509-10. Weigel describes an alternative strategy private equity sponsors
could use to decrease their tax burden whereby the general partner would take a two
percent fee from each portfolio company instead of the current management fee investors
pay. See id. The general partner would also receive a stock option from the portfolio
company that would replace the twenty percent carried interest general partners currently
receive from investors. See id.
360. See id. at 510-11. Weigel argues that taking the fees from the portfolio company
would give the companies the benefit of those deductions, which they could take above
the line to offset ordinary income, thus reducing tax revenue. See id.
361. See Jeremy Scott, Carried Interest Debate Highlights Issues with Progressivity, 141
TAX NOTES 569, 569 (2013) (stating that the debate on carried interest has not been
prevalent in politics since 2010 but that Sun Capital touched on the issue and that
commentators still push for ordinary income treatment of carried interest). On February
26, 2014, the House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp released a draft
comprehensive tax reform plan that proposes to tax some carried interest at ordinary
income rates. See Elliott, supra note 314, at 1025. In what some are calling a reference to
Sun Capital, Congressman Camp stated in the proposal that a partnership "that is in the
business of raising capital, investing in other businesses, developing such businesses, and
ultimately selling them, is in the trade or business of selling businesses." Amy S. Elliott,
Camp Draft Forgoes Unified Passthrough Regime, 142 TAX NOTES 886, 887 (2014). For a
discussion of the benefits to both general partners and limited partners of having carried
interest taxed at capital gains rates, see Sanchirico, supra note 36, at 1079.
362. See Steve Judge, Why a Pension Case Will Not Change Private Equity Tax Law,
N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Nov. 4, 2013, 3:13 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com
/2013/11/04/why-a-pension-case-will-not-change-private-equity-tax-law?_r=0. Steve
Judge, president and chief executive of the PEGCC, argues that it would be unfair to tax
carried interest at ordinary income rates because it would deny private equity funds the
favorable tax treatment available to other kinds of businesses that buy and sell capital
assets. See id.
363. See Cory M. Vargo, Carried Interest Taxation and Private (and Horizontal) Equity,
137 TAX NOTES 425,429 (2012).
364. See Rosenthal, supra note 274, at 365-66.
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equity "investment" and dealer activity, such as dealing in real
estate,3 65 is too strong for the two activities to be taxed differently.
Like real estate dealers, private equity funds make money from
management activities, which are generally taxed at ordinary income
rates, rather than merely from passive investment.366 The Sun Capital
court cited a commentator3 67 who has explained that "[i]t is one thing
to manage one's investments in businesses. It is another to manage
the businesses in which one invests. The hands-on nature of their
investment model is arguably a defining feature of private equity
partnerships." 6 Private equity funds engage in management activity
that should subject them to classification as engaged in a "trade or
business." In addition, there is no particular tax policy justification to
prefer those who deal in companies to those who deal in houses or
securities, so there should be no reason to give private equity
investors preferential tax treatment.369
However, even if private equity funds engage in a "trade or
business," they must still hold property "primarily for sale to
customers" in order to be subject to ordinary income rates.3 70 There
has been little analysis of whether private equity funds sell portfolio
companies "to customers." 371 Traders do not sell securities "to
customers" because, when they sell securities, they sell them on a
market and not to a particular buyer.372 Private equity funds, in
contrast, do not simply dump portfolio companies on the securities
market when they sell them.3 73 An argument can be made that private
equity funds sell their portfolio companies "to customers," but this
issue has not yet been tested since private equity funds, historically,
have not been classified as engaging in "trade or business" activity.3 74
Overall, it seems accurate to say that those in the private equity
365. See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1467.
366. See Rosenthal, supra note 274, at 366 ("The tax law should not permit private
equity funds to transform their income from everyday operations of a business into capital
gains through the sale of stock of the improved company.").
367. See Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 134 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014).
368. Sanchirico, supra note 36, at 1103.
369. See Rosenthal, supra note 274, at 365-66.
370. See I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1) (2012).
371. But see Rosenthal, supra note 274, at 363-66 (arguing that private equity funds
could be said to hold portfolio companies "primarily for sale to customers" much like real
estate developers deal in real estate, operating as a "middleman business" between sellers
and buyers).
372. See id. at 363-64.
373. The portfolio companies of private equity are by definition not publicly traded.
374. See Brief of the Private Equity Growth Capital Council as Amicus Curiae, supra
note 5, at 6.
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industry "have been interpreting tax law wrong for 20 years as to
whether there's a trade or business."375 Since there are strong
arguments for taxing private equity funds at ordinary income rates,
the issue becomes deciding who should make the change in how
private equity funds characterize their income.
2. Should Courts or the Treasury Change Taxation of Private Equity
Profits in the Absence of Congressional Action?
The courts do not have the authority to unilaterally alter the
taxation of private equity, as the First Circuit itself recognized in its
refusal to define the "plus" of its "investment plus" standard and in
its "dismay" at the PBGC's failure to promulgate regulations.376 If
courts apply their own definitions without administrative or
legislative guidance, private equity funds will lack the procedural
protections provided by notice and comment in shaping the rule.377 In
addition, some argue that since the private equity industry has been
taxed for twenty years at capital gains rates, changing the
characterization of their activity now would create more difficulty.7
Although the Treasury, through regulations, could make these
changes and characterize private equity as engaged in a "trade or
business," the difficulty of taking action makes it unlikely that the
Treasury will act. Some speculate that the Treasury could use Sun
Capital as a basis for reevaluating its regulations on the
characterization of carried interest in particular.37 9 True, a Treasury
spokesman has stated that the Treasury may reconsider its previous
375. Elliott, supra note 296, at 820.
376. See Sun Capital Partners III v. New Eng. Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension
Fund, 724 F.3d 129, 141, 148 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014).
377. See Rosenthal, supra note 2, at 1470 n.116 (arguing that if courts apply the rule
from Sun Capital in the tax context without further guidance, funds may also "whipsaw the
government," with some claiming an ordinary loss on portfolio sales and others claiming
capital gains rates on their profits). But see Jane Sasseen, With Tax Advantages Looking
Shaky, Private Equity Seeks a New Path, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 21, 2013, 3:16 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/with-tax-advantages-looking-shaky-private-
equity-seeks-a-new-path/?_r=0 (indicating that private equity firms have had notice of
possible changes to the characterization of carried interest for tax purposes because of the
political pressure to characterize private equity income as ordinary income, and stating
that firms have already started preparing for this change).
378. See Elliott, supra note 296, at 820. William L. McRae, a tax practitioner, has stated
that "[w]hatever you think about the last 20 years of advice and what people have called
settled law, to deviate from that is going to be very difficult to do in the future without at
least a political process." Id.
379. See Rubin, supra note 234.
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position on carried interest.3 0 However, even if the Treasury takes
action in response to Sun Capital, it is problematic to have a court and
an administrative agency decide to classify private equity activity as
"trade or business" activity when Congress has declined to change
this rule in spite of years of political pressure to do so.8 '
CONCLUSION
In holding that Sun Fund IV was a "trade or business," the First
Circuit took a new and unexpected stance on that term's definition
and created a new rule for determining whether an entity is a "trade
or business," at least in the context of § 1301(b)(1). The court left this
rule, the "investment plus" standard, intentionally vague in an effort
to avoid ' creating a general precedent with the potential to
dramatically alter both ERISA and tax law. In creating this new
standard, the court adapted persuasive authority from other sources.
The "investment plus" standard represents an improved
interpretation of Groetzinger while not betraying other Supreme
Court precedent. Although the court could have better clarified its
agency analysis, even this aspect of the opinion finds some support in
legal precedent and plenty of support in basic logic.
Discussion of the First Circuit's ruling in Sun Capital will
hopefully prompt Congress, the Treasury, or the PBGC to act and
classify private equity funds as engaged in a "trade or business" under
both ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code. More cases dealing
with the question of whether private equity funds engage in a "trade
or business" are likely to arise, and when they do, the courts should
not be the ones to decide this crucial issue. Ideally, Congress should
act to state that private equity funds are engaged in "trade or
business" activity for purposes of the IRC. However, there is no
indication that Congress intends to act on this issue, especially when
the related issue of taxing carried interest at ordinary income rates
380. See id. (quoting Craig Gerson, an attorney-advisor at the Treasury Office of Tax
Legislative Counsel, as saying, "There's a recognition that the court's decision may give us
an opportunity to reassess what 'trade or business' means, but I think that there won't be
any rush to issue guidance on this").
381. See Steven M. Davidoff, A Chance to End a Billion-Dollar Tax Break for Private
Equity, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 23, 2013, 6:23 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com
/2013/10/22/chance-to-end-billion-dollar-tax-break-for-private-equity/?_r=1. The Obama
administration has tried repeatedly to tax private equity profits as income. Id. But it may
now be that the "battle to tax carried interest is not won or lost in the halls of Congress
over high-minded concepts of fairness or equity but rather in the halls of the I.R.S. by
applying common-sense presumptions that existed all along." Id.
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has not been a major topic of discussion in Congress since 2 010.m1
Although the tax law does seem to have been wrongly applied by
private equity funds for decades, it seems unlikely that the taxation of
private equity funds will change in the near future. In the absence of
action by Congress, the Treasury should announce regulations that
clarify that a private equity fund is a "trade or business." This
determination will have the benefit of giving investors notice, even if
it accomplishes through administrative action something that should
be accomplished through legislative action. However, this action also
is unlikely.
If neither Congress nor the Treasury act, Sun Capital indicates
that the courts will have to try to reach fair results on an ad hoc basis
as they rule on individual cases. These judicial efforts to reach the
correct legal conclusion may result in more cases like Sun Capital that
conflict with the traditional (and incorrect) categorization of private
equity funds as investors. These piecemeal judicial determinations
could create inconsistent precedent and harm the overall uniformity
of the tax system. Therefore, the First Circuit's holding does not
constitute a useful precedent but instead represents a call to action to
change through the legislative process the private equity sector's
incorrect interpretation of tax law. Since the Treasury and IRS
probably will not use Sun Capital as an opportunity to change the
taxation of private equity funds, the current taxation regime will
likely continue.
VALERIE M. HUGHES"
382. See Scott, supra note 361, at 569. But see Elliott, supra note 361, at 887 (discussing
Congressman Camp's proposal to reform taxation of some carried interest).
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